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THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUCATION ACT: A PARENT'S
PERSPECTIVE AND PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
Martin A. Kotler*
PREFACE
For two years, beginning in the fall of 1991, I was involved
in an ongoing legal battle with the Delaware County,
Pennsylvania Intermediate Unit No. 251 regarding the
"appropriateness" of preschool programming for my son. To a
large degree, the following Article has its origin in that battle.2
Nevertheless, the point of this Article is neither to get even
for wrongs, real or imagined, nor to utilize these pages to
supplement the already extensive briefs and formal arguments
made in that case. Rather, I believe that my position as a law
professor, lawyer, litigant, and parent of a disabled child gives
me a somewhat unique perspective on the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or Act),3 and the Act's
shortcomings in practice, in theory, and in underlying
assumption. The following pages lay out some of those
shortcomings and what can be done to remedy them.
. * Professor of Law, Widener University, School of Law. B.A. 1972, George
Washington University; J.D. 1975, University of California, Hastings College of Law;
LL.M. 1984 & J.S.D. 1989, New York University School of Law.
1. In Pennsylvania, Intermediate Units (IUs) are public entities created under
state law and charged with the responsibility for providing special education services
for students between the ages of 6 and 21. In 1990, the Pennsylvania legislature
passed the Early Intervention Services System Act (EISSA), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 875-101 to -503 (Supp. 1994) (effective July 1, 1991) which placed responsibility
upon the Pennsylvania Department of Education to provide programming for children
between the ages of three and six. Id. § 875-304. The EISSA also gave the
Department of Education authority to contract for the provision of these services with
the Intermediate Units. Id. § 875-304. Delaware County Intermediate Unit 25
entered into such an agreement with the Department of Education thereby making
it responsible for the provision of free, appropriate, public education under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (Supp. V 1993),
and state law.
2. See Delaware County Intermediate Unit No. 25 v. Martin K., 831 F. Supp.
1206 (E.D. Pa. 1993); In re The Educ. Assignment of Paul K., Special Educ. Op. No.
568 (Special Educ. Due Process App. Review Panel mailed June 2, 1992).
3. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (originally enacted as the
"The Education of the Handicapped Act" (EHA), Pub. L. No. 91-230, tit. VI, § 601, 84
Stat. 175 (1970) and amended by "The Education for All Handicapped Children Act"
(EAHCA), Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
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In response to the inevitable charge that my personal
involvement in litigation under the Act distorts my perspective
rather than enhances it, I believe two comments are in order.
First, the purpose of writing this preface is to inform the
reader of my involvement from the outset, so that the reader
can assess the content of my views in the light of that infor-
mation. My second comment goes to my motivation and that
of others who engage in the process of legal writing. It seems
self-evident that we write to persuade our chosen audience,
whether other law professors, the practicing bar, the bench, or
legislators, that our ideas are right and thus worthy of
adoption or at least consideration.
Some years ago I am told, David Brinkley was accused of not
being "objective" in his public comments regarding some event.
His response, or at least the one attributed to him, was that
it was not his job to be objective, but that it was his job to be
fair. Along the same lines, my goal in writing this Article is
not to be objective, but rather to present various issues about
which I have very strong beliefs, in a sufficiently compelling
manner to persuade the objective reader that my analysis is
correct. If, as some colleagues have suggested, that makes this
Article "advocacy" rather than "scholarship," so be it. Although
I will attempt to be fair, the reader is the ultimate judge of
whether I have succeeded in that attempt.
Before beginning any discussion of the relevant legislation,
I believe it is important to describe an ongoing debate within
the community of psychologists, both as a reference point for
the discussion which follows and for the light which this
debate sheds on the Act. This debate concerns autism, which
was first identified as a distinct collection of symptoms by Dr.
Leo Kanner in 1943. 4 Dr. Kanner observed children who
displayed no dysmorphic features or other significant signs of
physical abnormality, but who failed to communicate with and
to form significant attachment to other people.
Initially, the study of autism was dominated by adherents
of a psychoanalytic approach. During the 1950s and 1960s, the
leading explanation for autism was that children suffering
from it had been shown insufficient love by their mothers and
began to look inward and reject those around them as a
4. Leo KannerAutistic Disturbances ofAffective Contact, 2 NERVOUS CHILD 217,
242-48 (1943).
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defense to parental rejection.5 This theory of autism,
commonly referred to as the "refrigerator mother" theory, held
sway within the community of psychologists for about twenty
years. During that period of time, parents-particularly
mothers-were subjected to psychoanalysis to discover why
they had rejected their children. According to one study
conducted during this period, autistic children were being
institutionalized by adulthood at a rate as high as seventy-six
percent. 6
By the late 1960s and early 1970s a number of psycholo-
gists, including Dr. Eric Schopler, himself a former adherent
to the psychoanalytic approach,' recognized the destructive
fallacy of this view.' Schopler posited that autism was neuro-
logical in origin, but of unknown etiology. Importantly, he
viewed the disorder as a single entity, rather than as a
collection of behavioral symptoms. 9
5. See, e.g., BRUNO BETTELHEIM, LOVE IS NOT ENOUGH: THE TREATMENT OF
EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED CHILDREN (1950) (stressing the role of parents' method of
showing love in the formation of their children's emotional disorders); BRUNO
BETrELHEIM, THE EMPTY FORTRESS: INFANTILE AUTISM AND THE BIRTH OF THE SELF (1967)
(suggesting that parental indifference or hostility to a child is the root of infant
autism); see also CHERYL D. SEIFERT, THEORIES OF AUTISM 67-68 (1990) (discussing
Bettelheim's psychoanalytic theory and treatment).
6. P. Mittler et al., Prognosis in Psychotic Children: Report of a Follow-up
Study, 10 J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY RES. 73, 75 (1966). Bettelheim's theory itself called for
the removal of the child from the home. See SEIFERT, supra note 5, at 67 ("During the
1960s, when Bettelheim's therapeutic ideas prevailed, it was recommended that the
autistic child be removed from parental influence and care to provide an environment
totally different from the one he was presumed to have abandoned in despair.").
Most studies showed institutionalization rates between 40 and 45%. See Eric
Schopler et al., Evaluation of Treatment for Autistic Children and their Parents, 21
J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 262, 266 (1982).
7. See, e.g., Eric Schopler, The Development of Body Image and Symbol
Formation through Bodily Contact with an Autistic Child, 3 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. &
PSYCHIATRY 191, 195 (1962) (basing his observations of an autistic child on "certain
concepts derived from the typical mothering process").
8. See Eric Schopler, Specific and Nonspecific Factors in the Effectiveness of a
Treatment System, 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 376, 379 (1987) ("For several decades autism was
interpreted in terms of psychodynamic theory, which explained the syndrome as a
social withdrawal from cold, hostile, and rejecting parents. However, no empirical
evidence was produced for this interpretation."); see also Eric Schopler, Parents of
Psychotic Children as Scapegoats, 4 J. CONTEMP. PSYCHOTHERAPY 17, 17-22 (1971)
(discussing the scapegoating of parents of autistic and psychotic children by mental
health professionals and suggesting ways of combatting it).
9. See Michael Rutter & Eric Schopler, Autism and Pervasive Developmental
Disorders: Concepts and Diagnostic Issues, 17 J. AUTISM & DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS
159, 166-71 (1987) (discussing autism in terms of the underlying deficit rather than
the symptoms of that deficit); see also 0. Ivar Lovaas & Tristram Smith, Intensive
Behavioral Treatment for Young Autistic Children, in 11 ADVANCES IN CLINICAL CHILD
PSYCHOL. 285, 316 (Benjamin B. Lahey & Alan E. Kazdin eds., 1988) (observing that
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Schopler and his colleagues at the University of North
Carolina (UNC) assumed that recovery was impossible until
such time as the neurological cause could be identified and
addressed. Based on this assumption, they developed a
methodology aimed at teaching autistic children skills suffi-
cient to avoid institutionalization. ° Specifically, the goal of
UNC's "Division TEACCH"" was, and is, to permit the autistic
child to remain in the community, albeit in highly supervised,
structured living and employment environments.1 2 For many
years, Division TEACCH was adopted widely by public school
systems throughout the country as the model of special
education for autistic individuals.
13
In 1970, Dr. 0. Ivar Lovaas, a professor of psychology at the
University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), began a
controlled study attempting to determine whether he could
improve the social and intellectual functioning of young
autistic children by subjecting them to an intensive "behavior-
al" approach at an early age.'4 Fifty-nine children, all of whom
.organic theories of autistic behaviors have apparently not considered the possibility
of reversibility of-organic damage with early environmental interventions").
10. See generally SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTISM 265-371 (Eric Schopler & Gary B.
Mesibov eds., 1986) (discussing programs designed to teach autistic children social
behaviors). Schopler has, in fact, claimed that his program has reduced the institu-
tionalization rate significantly. See Schopler et al., supra note 6, at 266-67. Whether
this reduction is attributable to the programming or to the nationwide trend toward
deinstitutionalization of the psychiatric population has been questioned. See Lovaas
& Smith, supra note 9, at 319-20.
11. Division TEACCH (Treatment and Education of Autistic and Related
Communication Handicapped Children) is a division of the Department of Psychiatry,
School of Medicine at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill.
12. See J. Gregory Olley, The TEACCH Curriculum for Teaching Social Behavior
to Children with Autism, in SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTISM, supra note 10, at 351, 356.
Olley describes TEACCH's goals as follows:
The TEACCH Social Skills Curriculum emphasizes social skills which can
reasonably be taught in schools but which have wide application in home, work,
recreation, and other community settings. This emphasis upon independent
functioning does not mean that all or even a substantial portion of autistic
adults are expected to live independently. Good social skills make even partial
participation in adapted tasks with supervision more feasible, and they surely
make acceptance by members of the community more likely.
Id.
13. One possible reason for the widespread adoption of TEACCH is that it may
have been the best program in existence when it was first developed.
14. 0. Ivar Lovaas, Behavioral Treatment and Normal Educational and
Intellectual Functioning in Young Autistic Children, 55 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 3, 13 (1987); see also Lovaas & Smith, supra note 9. Earlier studies
regarding the behavioral treatment of autistic children are discussed in AUBREY J.
YATES, BEHAVIOR THERAPY 246-72 (1970) and Lovaas & Smith, supra note 9, at 293.
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had been diagnosed as autistic by physicians or psychologists
not connected with the study, were assigned to either an
experimental group or one of two control groups.' 5 The
nineteen children in the experimental group received more
than forty hours per week of one-on-one therapy provided
primarily by undergraduates at UCLA. Nineteen others in the
first control group received ten or fewer hours per week of the
same type of one-on-one therapy. The remaining twenty-one
children were assigned to the second control group and
received traditional types of programming that were available
in the community.
Following two to three years of this programming, nine of
the nineteen children (forty-seven percent) from the experi-
mental group were able to pass normal first grade in a public
school, while none of the children from the first control group
and only one child from the second control group were able to
do so.
16
Table 1, on the following page, summarizes the results of Dr.
Lovaas' study.
A follow-up study published in 1993 showed that of the nine
children who had been integrated fully into the public schools,
eight remained intellectually and socially indistinguishable
from their peers.' 7 These studies indicate that autistic children
may recover from their disability, thus permitting them to be
fully integrated into public schools.
During the same period of time, psychologists at other
institutions who were utilizing similar, intensive behavioral
intervention began to report results similar to those reported
15. For a complete description of the study's methodology, see Lovaas, supra note
14, at 4-5.
16. Id. at 6-7. It is in this context that the validity of the claim that there is a
single entity which can be characterized as "autism" becomes important. See supra
text accompanying note 9. If the disorder is a single entity, it is difficult to explain
why only some children respond to the intensive therapy. If, on the other hand, there
are a number of conditions which can cause similar symptoms, then to have some,
but not all, children respond to a particular treatment is understandable. The
important question for researchers is not why the treatment is ineffective in some
cases, but what there is about those children who responded well that distinguishes
them from those who did not. See Lovaas & Smith, supra note 9, at 314 (noting that
differences in childrens' responses to treatment may suggest different cases of autism
and may complicate research on symptoms common to all autistic children).
17. John J. McEachin et al., Long-Term Outcome for Children With Autism Who
Received Early Intensive Behavioral Treatment, 97 AM. J. ON MENTAL RETARDATION 359,
367-68 (1993).
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TABLE 1
EDUCATIONAL PLACEMENT AND
MEAN AND RANGE OF IQ AT FOLLOW-UP
Group Recovered Aphasic Autistic/Retarded
Experimental
N 9 8 2
MIQ 107 70 30
Range 94-120 56-95 ---
Control Group 1
N 0 8 11
MIQ --- 74 36
Range --- 30-102 20-73
Control Group 2
N 1 10 10
MIQ 99 67 44
Range --- 49-81 35-54
Source: 0. Ivar Lovaas, Behavioral Treatment and Normal Educational
and Intellectual Functioning in Young Autistic Children, 55 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 3, 7 tbl. 3 (1987).
Note: Dashes indicate no score or entry.
*Both children received the same score.
by Dr. Lovaas, namely that roughly half of the children
suffering from autism can recover from the disabling symp-
toms of their disorder if provided with highly intensive,
behavioral therapy at a very young age.' 8
18. See, e.g., Edward C. Fenske et al., Age at Intervention and Treatment Out-
come for Autistic Children in a Comprehensive Intervention Program, 5 ANALYSIS &
INTERVENTION DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 49, 55 (1985) (finding that 67% of children
improved when therapy began before age five). Dr. Phillip Strain, a leading
researcher in the field, has advised that he and his colleagues are in the process of
concluding a 15 year longitudinal outcome study of autistic children who have been
involved in the program which he has developed called LEAP or Learning
Experiences . .. An Alternative Program for Preschoolers and Parents. Telephone
Interview with Phillip S. Strain, Ph.D., Assistant Executive Director, St. Peter's
Child Development Centers, Inc. (Aug. 24, 1994). Although the final results have not
yet been published, they appear to be quite similar to those reported previously by
Dr. Lovaas. Preliminary results of Dr. Strain's research can be found in the following
articles: Marilyn Hoyson et al., Individualized Group Instruction of Normally
Developing and Autistic-like Children: The LEAP Curriculum Model, 8 J. DIVISION FOR
EARLY CHILDHOOD 157 (1984); Phillip S. Strain et al., Normally Developing Preschoolers
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Those unfamiliar with American special education might
assume that such a programming breakthrough would be
hailed and embraced by the educational establishment.
Unfortunately, that has not been the case. Despite the lack of
evidence that the Lovaas findings are wrong, there has been
enormous resistance to implementing Lovaas-type programs. 9
The disagreement over whether to provide TEACCH or
Lovaas-type programs is not unique. In fact, disagreements
are apt to occur in many areas related to the education of
developmentally disabled children. Most, however, ultimately
flow from conflicts in basic underlying assumptions regarding
the children's ability to learn.2 ° An assumption that autistic
children cannot learn, or that they cannot learn very much,-
shapes the decisions regarding the types of programs provided
for them, including their methodology, intensity, and goals.
This assumption also shapes views about the validity of
expenditures for such programs.2'
as Intervention Agents for Autistic-Like Children: Effects on Class Deportment and
Social Interaction, 10 J. DIVISION FOR EARLY CHILDHOOD 105 (1985); Phillip S. Strain,
Comprehensive Evaluation of Intervention for Young Autistic Children, 7 ToPics EARLY
CHILDHOOD SPECIAL EDUC. 97 (1987).
19. This is not to say that Dr. Lovaas' methodology has not been criticized. See,
e.g., Gary B. Mesibov, Treatment Outcome Is Encouraging, 97 AM. J. ON MENTAL
RETARDATION 379 (1993); Eric Schopler et al., Relation of Behavior Treatment to
"Normal Functioning. Comment on Lovaas, 57 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 162,
162-64 (1989). But see 0. Ivar Lovaas et al., Clarifying Comments on the Young
Autism Study: Reply to Schopler, Short and Mesibov, 57 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 165, 165-67 (1989) (responding to criticism); Donald M. Baer, Quasi-Random
Assignment Can Be as Convincing as Random Assignment, 97 AM. J. ON MENTAL
RETARDATION 373 (1993) (same); Tristram Smith et al. Comments on Replication and
Evaluation of Outcome, 97 AM. J. ON MENTAL RETARDATION 385 (1993) (same).
20. Perhaps the best definition of "mental retardation" is that provided by H.
Carl Haywood: "[Miental retardation is not an entity. It is a collection of well over
200 syndromes that have only one element in common: relative inefficiency at
learning by the methods and strategies devised for other people to learn." H. Carl
Haywood, Reaction Comment, in PRESIDENT'S COMMITEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, THE
MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 677, 677 (Michael Kindred et al. eds., 1976).
21. In fact, in at least one article the entire method of evaluating the effective-
ness of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, and the resulting conclusions,
were based largely on an assumption of the children's limited capacity. William H.
Clune & Mark H. Van Pelt, A Political Method of Evaluating the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 and the Several Gaps of Gap Analysis, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1985, at 7. The authors engaged in an extensive and
perceptive critical analysis of the Act which indicated clearly that as implemented,
the Act was not accomplishing its reformist goals. Nevertheless, using what they
called a "political method" of analysis, they concluded that many of the key elements
of the Act, including the requirement of "individualized" programming, were
unrealistic and expendable. Id. at 54-55. "Coarse programmatic categories are
probably all that can be managed," they wrote. Id. at 54. "Tutorial programs would
be nice for handicapped children, but they would be nice for other children, too." Id.
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Even if agreement existed as to the ability of disabled children
to learn, however, there would remain the potential for
disagreement on the mechanics of the educational process. For
example, even within a model that accepts that many children
have the capacity to reach the level of their nondisabled peers,
assessing an individual child's capacity and deciding how to
respond to uncertainty regarding that capacity will remain
problematic. Furthermore, even if there is basic agreement on
capacity, assessment, and goals, there is room for disagreement
as to whether the program or methodology which has been
selected is being implemented effectively.
The following pages identify the relevant considerations and
offer some suggestions as to how these conflicts can be reduced,
eliminated or resolved.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE IDEA AS
CLASSICAL LIBERAL LEGALISM
In many respects, the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act and its predecessors can be seen as examples of classical
liberal legalism.2" As such, the Act first involves the selection
of goals, identification of values, and assignment of rights
through a pluralist political process.23 Second, the Act seeks to
As I will try to make clear in the course of this Article, special education practices
have little to do with what would be "nice" and a great deal to do with what is
essential. This is a significant distinction, because disabled children's opportunities
for meaningful lives are at stake.
22. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND
AMERICAN LAW 146-58 (1990) (discussing social contract theory as based on the idea
of freedom of contract between independent individuals); Joel F. Handler, Dependent
People, The State, and the Modern IPostmodern Search for the Dialogic Community,
35 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1008-12 (1988) (describing the special education system under
the Act as a regulatory failure); David Neal & David L. Kirp, The Allure ofLegalization
Reconsidered: The Case of Special Education, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1985,
at 63, 65 (discussing legalization as a means of policymaking "premised on the
classically liberal belief that individuals, and not the organization charged with
delivering a good or service, can best safeguard their own interests").
23. Professor Minow uses the terminology of"rights" rather than "legalism." MINOW,
supra note 22, at 146-56. Professors Neal and Kirp use the term "legalization," which
they define as a method of giving "substance to a policy objective" characterized by
"a focus on the individual as the bearer of rights . .. and the employment of legal
techniques such as written agreements and court-like procedures to enforce and protect
rights." Neal & Kirp, supra note 22, at 65; see also Mark G. Yudof, Legalization of
Dispute Resolution, Distrust of Authority, and Organizational Theory: Implementing
Due Process for Students in the Public Schools, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 891,895 ("Legalization
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ensure that the selected goals will be implemented, the
identified values protected, and the assigned rights enforced
against competing claims through the utilization of fixed
procedural rules to prevent the more powerful from evading
those goals and values.24
The Act espoused two interrelated substantive goals:
(1) disabled children were to be provided with a free, appropri-
ate, public education,25 and (2) such education was to be
provided in the least restrictive environment.26
The justification for these goals overtly embraces both a
Kantian rights theory and a Benthamite utilitarian basis.2 v A
rights theory requires the provision of education as an
acknowledgement of the disabled person's dignity as a human
being. A utilitarian model, on the other hand, requires the
reduction of disability because of the long-term cost effective-
ness of such reduction, and reflects the prevalence of an
economic model of law which is itself based on a utilitarian
philosophical and political foundation.28
rests on the idea of individual rights, particularly procedural entitlements against the
state, which may or may not advance the collective interest.").
24. Handler, supra note 22, at 1061; see also infra text accompanying note 30.
25. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. V 1993).
26. Id. § 1412(5)(B) (Supp. V 1993); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.550-.556 (1993).
27. One author has described the interplay between these two types of values as
follows:
Values were to be discovered either through the utilitarian calculus or
Kantian-based ontological rights. Whose values should prevail? Whether
utilitarian or Kantian, the state would not choose. Rather, the task of the state
was to provide a neutral framework. Under utilitarianism, the ends, the good
life, would be the sum of preferences. The Kantians reject utilitarianism as a
basis of moral law; its instrumentalism does not provide sufficient protection for
freedom and rights and treats individuals as means to the happiness of others
rather than as ends in themselves. The Kantians take rights much more
seriously, but it is still fundamental to the preservation of these
individually-based rights that the state remain neutral; they cannot be over-
ridden for the general welfare .... Neither utilitarians nor Kantians can agree
on what values are fundamental or on what frameworks are appropriate to
enhance those values. Through the bargaining of pluralism, the political
community would agree upon certain values, and these would be enacted into
law.
Handler, supra note 22, at 1061 (citation omitted).
28. This utilitarian model is reflected in the goals of the EHA's sponsors,
described by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit as follows:
The EHA's sponsors stressed the importance of teaching skills that would foster
personal independence for two reasons. First, they advocated dignity for
handicapped children. Second, they stressed the long-term financial savings of
WINTER 19941
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Certainly, there is nothing unique in the notion of law being
rooted in both philosophical traditions. Although in many
areas of the law this may result in conflict,29 special education
policy seems to be one of those areas where the goals of both
traditions can be promoted simultaneously.
This is not to say, however, that merely identifying the
goals, values, and rights underlying the Act will result in their
implementation in the special education context. Provision for
the inevitability of implementation failures represents yet
another facet of legalism-protection of values. In other words,
in drafting the Act it was necessary to readjust existing power
structures to protect those rights. As Professor Handler
explained:
There is also the issue of power. Laws are not always
clear, and people, including officials, cannot be counted on
to be always law-abiding. According to the liberal legalists,
the weak can protect themselves in the day-to-day dealings
with officials through the rule of law. Formalism is the
substantive restraint on all, citizens and officials alike;
procedural due process is the mechanism by which the
weak can protect themselves from the lawbreaking
powerful .
early education and assistance for handicapped children. A chief selling point
of the Act was that although it is penny dear, it is pound wise-the expensive
individualized assistance early in life, geared toward teaching basic life skills
and self-sufficiency, eventually redounds to the benefit of the public fisc as these
children grow to become productive citizens.
Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 181-82 (3d Cir.
1988). These goals were expressed in a Senate report stating:
The long range implications of these statistics are that public agencies and
taxpayers will spend billions of dollars over the lifetimes of these individuals
to maintain such persons as dependents and in a minimally acceptable lifestyle.
With proper education services, many would be able to become productive
citizens, contributing to society instead of being forced to remain burdens.
S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,
1433.
29. See, e.g., Martin A. Kotler, Competing Conceptions of Autonomy: A
Reappraisal of the Basis of Tort Law, 67 TUL. L. REV. 347 (1992) (discussing the
conflict of Kantian rights theory and Benthamite utilitarian basis in the context of
tort law).
30. Handler, supra note 22, at 1061.
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Notwithstanding the procedural protections set forth in the
Act,3 scholars and parents are virtually unanimous in criti-
cizing the manner in which the Act functions.32 Ambiguity and
disagreement regarding what constitutes a substantively
"appropriate" program are commonplace. The formalistic
procedures to protect parental rights have not served to level
the playing fields between parents and educators.33 Procedural
protections all too often have been reduced to mere empty
ritual for all but the most educated and wealthy.34
Once we accept that the system is not working as envi-
sioned, there are essentially two responses possible. The first
is to insist that "legalization" is a method which is incapable
of dealing with this problem because it often pits relatively
powerless individuals against a complex and powerful bureau-
cracy. Certainly some writers have taken this position. Those
writers have analyzed the problem of education for the
disabled from the perspective of other schools of legal thought,
primarily feminism or communitarianism.
35
If, however, we are not yet prepared to abandon legalization
as a means by which social problems can be solved, then it
becomes necessary to look at the Act, considering its terms, its
goals, and its underlying assumptions to determine how it is
31. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (Supp. V 1993) (requiring agencies to maintain such
procedures as notice, due process hearings, and review of decisions).
32. See, eg., MILTON BUDOFF & ALAN ORNrEIN, DUE PROCESS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION:
ON GOING TO A HEARING 44-45 (1982); Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 21.
33. As Professor Handler noted:
The average parent, especially in lower socio-economic classes, does not have
the ability to participate. In addition to the psychological burdens of coping with
a handicapped child, most parents lack the information and the resources to
deal with the school bureaucracy. Both participation in the meetings and
consent to the placement are usually formalities only .... Parents are out-
gunned: they are strangers confronting a group of people who have worked
together and struck a bargain ....
Handler, supra note 22, at 1010.
34. See BUDOFF & ORENSTEIN, supra note 32, at 44-46; Clune & Van Pelt, supra
note 21, at 34-36.
35. See Handler, supra note 22, at 1034-49 (discussing the major trends in juris-
prudence which compete with the liberal legal model); see also MINOW, supra note 22
(discussing the treatment of difference by social contract theory, law and economics
theory, and critical legal studies). Some writers are skeptical of the possibility of
abandoning formalism. Professor Yudof, for example, has asserted that
"[nionformalism is premised on trust, and trust is lacking in the school environment.
Formalism did not create that mistrust, it is merely a manifestation of the underlying
lack of community." Yudof, supra note 23, at 920.
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failing, why it is failing, and what, if anything, can be done
about it. In order to engage in such an analysis, it is necessary
to recognize that the sources of failure or the impediments to
success can be located in areas both internal and external to
the Act itself. Although much of this Article deals with the
internal shortcomings of the legislation, of even greater
importance to the success of the Act is the existence of an
underlying social consensus in favor of educating the handi-
capped. In the absence of such a consensus and broad-based
willingness to be bound by the Act, failure is inevitable.36
The lack of consensus as to the possibility of achieving major
increases in a child's intellectual and social functioning may
be the sign of a self-fulfilling prophecy in operation. Low
expectations lead to ineffective programming. Poor program-
ming yields poor results. Poor results are then interpreted by
many as proof of the original misperception that education for
the disabled child is a well-meaning but ultimately futile
gesture.
If this misperception continues to exist and the goals of the
Act are not perceived as being within the realm of possibility,
the briefly formed consensus which prevailed when the Act
was passed will evaporate, particularly in the face of scarce
resources.37 As a result, the Act will become largely superflu-
ous in the day-to-day realities of the provision of special
education.
The key assumption underlying this Article is that success
is attainable, and, once attained, can break the cycle of low
expectation and failure which currently drives the system.
Once the fundamental underlying commitment to special
36. There are a number of reasons why the public might be unwilling to be
bound by the Act. Some of these reasons are as follows:
With sharply increasing local and state tax burdens, those who perceive no real
benefit from public schools may also be more critical of educators' performance.
Such critics may begin to view education as a private and not a public good. The
civil rights movement, the perceived failure of many Johnsonian social programs
and a growing anti-professional bias may further contribute to the decline in
public trust in public schools.
Yudof, supra note 23, at 896 (citation omitted).
37. See James H. Stark, Tragic Choices in Special Education: The Effect of Scarce
Resources on the Implementation of Pub. L. No. 94-142, 14 CONN. L. REV. 477,
478-504 (discussing the effects of scarce resources on the implementation of EAHCA)
(1982); see also Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., The Need for a Strong Education for All
Handicapped Children Act, 14 CONN. L. REV. 471 (1982) (arguing against proposed
cuts in the federal funds available for educating handicapped children).
The Individuals with Disabilities Act
education is reestablished, interpretation and amendment of
the existing legislation to realize that commitment is entirely
possible within the framework of the liberal legal tradition.
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE GOALS UNDERLYING THE IDEA
A. A Brief History of the Pre-Act Exclusion of
Disabled Children From the Schools
1. Primary or Initial Exclusion-The events leading up to
the passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
(EAHCA)"8 and the manner in which these events influenced
the content and structure of the Act are relatively clear.39 A
form of primary or initial exclusion existed because many
statutes expressly barred disabled children from attending
public schools.4 ° Successful legal challenges to this type of
intentional exclusion commenced in the 1970s with Pennsylva-
nia Ass'n of Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania4 1 and a series
of similar cases elsewhere.42 Clearly much of the Act can be
seen as an attempt to remedy this problem. The legislative
history of the Act specifically notes that 1.75 million handi-
capped children between birth and twenty-one years of age
were "receiving no educational services at all."43
38. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1461 (Supp. V 1993).
39. A good discussion of the background of the enactment of EAHCA may be
found in Neal & Kirp, supra note 22, at 67-74.
40. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1375 (1962) (providing that schools may
exclude children who are "uneducable and untrainable"); id. § 13-1330 (providing that
schools may excuse further attendance of children who are "unable to profit'); see also
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-201, 79-202 (1971) (providing that the compulsory education
requirement did not apply to children who were "physically or mentally incapacitated
for the work done in the school"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 392.050 (1967) (excusing from
compulsory education requirements children whose "physical or mental condition or
attitude is such as to prevent or render inadvisable his attendance at school"); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 115-165 (1966) (providing that "[a] child so severely afflicted by mental,
emotional, or physical incapacity as to make it impossible for such child to profit by
instruction given in the public schools shall not be permitted to attend the public
schools of the State"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.04 (Anderson 1972).
41. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
42. See S. REP. No. 168, supra note 28, at 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1431 ("In recent years decisions in more than 36 court cases in the States have
recognized the rights of handicapped children to an appropriate education.").
43. Id. at 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1432; see also 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b)(1)-(9) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (finding that the educational needs of
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Another form of "primary" or "initial" exclusion from the
regular classroom resulted from misuse of the special education
system to rid the public schools of children deemed undesirable,
whether because of behavior or racial or ethnic prejudice. In
other words, children were incorrectly placed into special
education when they were not in need of such services, could
not derive an appropriate level of benefit from such services,
and could derive an appropriate level of benefit from placement
in a regular education class.
The same type of primary exclusion can occur as a result of
poorly designed testing measures44 which either intentionally
or unintentionally exclude children from regular education when
that would be an appropriate, beneficial placement.45 In fact,
there was a long history of abuse in the utilization of stan-
dardized testing with the result, and sometimes for the purpose,
of misplacing children into special education classes, thereby
achieving a de facto exclusion from public education.46 The
victims of this de facto exclusion certainly included, but were
not limited to, children who were labeled "disruptive."47
Describing the history of special education in America, one
commentator wrote:
Attacks on quality [of special education classes] proliferated.
A group of Boston school teachers told an investigating team
from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology that "special
classes are used as a 'dumping ground' for children who are
trouble-makers in their regular classes. These children often
do not have low I.Q.'s. Results of the Stanford-Binet tests
are sometimes deliberately rigged." Even more startling, a
highly placed official in the California State Department
of Public Instruction admitted that the intent of that state's
classes for the educable mentally retarded (EMR) from the
handicapped children are not being met); David Kirp et al., Legal Reform of Special
Education: Empirical Studies and Procedural Proposals, 62 CAL. L. REV. 40,41 (1974)
(noting that "[t]ypically, state law denies the most severely handicapped youngsters
any right to publicly supported schooling").
44. Kirp et al., supra note 43, at 43 (testing changes).
45. See infra note 53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact of
inappropriate placement in special education classes.
46. See Kirp et al., supra note 43, at 43-44 (noting that testing changes in
Philadelphia and Washington, D.C. in the 1960s revealed that two-thirds of handi-
capped students had been misclassified, and discussing which groups of students are
more likely to be placed in special education).
47. Id. at 44.
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late 1940s to the mid-1970s was not to provide intensive
services and education so that a child could return to regular
classes. The expectation and the practice was permanent
placement in the EMR class until the youth "dropped out"
of school.48
In addition to the disruptive child, racial and ethnic minorities
were long-standing victims of the educational system. Data
reflect the fact that a disproportionate number of these children
were placed in special education classes. 49 The misplacement
was often simply a means of accomplishing segregation.50 As
one commentator observed:
From its origins, special education was tied to views of
racial inferiority; without the ethnic and racial antagonisms
of the World War I years, special education would have
received only the most minimal attention. The racial biases
that made minorities the most likely candidates for
placement in inadequate special education classes continued
into the post-World War II period. Indeed, the biases played
much the same role they had before: public education and
special education expanded simultaneously, in the 1950s
and 1960s, allowing school systems both to incorporate large
48. Marvin Lazerson, The Origins of Special Education, in SPECIAL EDUCATION
POLICIES: THEIR HISTORY, IMPLEMENTATION AND FINANCE 15, 39 (Jay G. Chambers &
William T. Hartman eds., 1983) (citations omitted) [hereinafter SPECIAL EDUCATION
POLICIES]. It is interesting to note that the Stanford-Binet IQ test was used widely as
a predictor although that was certainly not the intent of its inventor. See infra text
accompanying note 62.
49. SEYMOUR B. SARASON & JOHN DORIS, EDUCATIONAL HANDICAP, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
SOCIAL HISTORY: A BROADENED PERSPECTE ON MENTAL RETARDATION 324-25, 340-42 (1979).
50. Some of the implications of the decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), were not lost on the parents of special needs children. Commentators
have observed that:
Although the 1954 desegregation decision did not deal directly with mental
retardation, the striking down of the "separate but equal" clause [sic] by the
Supreme Court came to have enormous consequences for mentally retarded people.
The argument that separate but equal facilities insidiously affected both black
and white children was not lost on some people who had similarly viewed the
consequences of special classes. Mental retardation, like so much else in our
society, became food for legal and judicial thought.
SARASON & DORIS, supra note 49, at 2.
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numbers of nonwhite pupils into the schools while simulta-
neously segregating them within the schools.5'
As in the case of the disruptive child, standardized testing was
intentionally or negligently misused to segregate children. The
tests employed yielded inaccurate results, either because of
built-in cultural bias or because of the obvious disadvantage
in test taking faced by children who did not speak, read, or write
English as a first language-or perhaps at all.52
Regardless of the reasons for it, misdiagnosis by itself can
result in long-term exclusion. Thus, for example, a child with
a learning disability which affects receptive and/or expressive
communication skills might be misdiagnosed as suffering from
retardation and excluded from the regular classroom. Long-term
exclusion may occur for two reasons. First, there may be a
reluctance to rethink one's opinion after initially labeling a
child. It has long been recognized that once a child has been
labeled, that label may well follow him long after it has ceased
to be objectively appropriate.53 Second, once a child has been
labeled and placed into typical "low intensity" special education
classes, the child will be taught less and thus fall further behind
51. Lazerson, supra note 48, at 40. But see Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 21, at
17 (noting the possibility that factors other than racial discrimination might account
for the disproportionate number of black children in special education classes).
52. See Michael S. Sorgen, The Classification Process and its Consequences, in
THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW, supra note 20, at 215, 229 ("Language
is another factor which can seriously affect the extremely sensitive relationship of
tester, child, and testing instrument. The grossest kind of linguistic handicap was
evident in Diana (No. C-70-37 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 1970)], where children were tested
in other than their primary language."); see also Natalie T. Darcy, Bilingualism and
the Measure of Intelligence: Reviews of a Decade of Research, 103 J. GENETIC PSYCHOL.
259, 281 (1963) (noting the effect of the testing instrument on conclusions about the
intelligence of bilingual test takers); E. Paul Torrence, Testing the Educational and
Psychological Development of Students from Other Cultures and Subcultures, 38 REV.
EDUC. REs. 71 (1968) (describing studies finding that scores on educational and
psychological tests varied among cultures and attempting to take those differences
into account).
53. David L. Kirp, Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional and Policy Implications
of Student Classification, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 705, 736-37 (1973) (discussing the
problems associated with labeling). It may be for this reason that the Act provides
safeguards against placing children in special education classes unnecessarily or based
on the results of discriminatory tests. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (Supp. V 1993).
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his non-disabled peers.5 4 Within a relatively short period of time,
catching up becomes a practical impossibility.5 5
2. Avoidance of Primary Exclusion: The Mainstreaming
Requirement-In response to the finding that handicapped
children were being excluded from public schools, Congress
provided for procedures by which the states were to identify
those children who were in need of services and not receiving
them, and for further procedures to bring these children into
the system.56 In recognition of the widespread existence of de
facto exclusion from mainstream public education by misclassi-
fication and inappropriate placement in special education
classes, Congress enacted section 1412(5) of the Act, which sets
forth the Congressional preference for integration into the
traditional classroom whenever such integration is "appropriate."57
54. There are really two aspects to this claim. The first is simply that less teaching
goes on in the special education class, so a widening gap between those in special
education and regular education is to be anticipated. See Kirp, supra note 53, at 735,
749. The second aspect involves what has been identified as "iatrogenic retardation."
Studies have indicated that if a child of normal intelligence mistakenly is labeled as
"retarded" and thereafter treated as though the diagnosis were correct, the child will
in fact become retarded. See SARASON & DORIS, supra note 49, at 154-56 (discussing
"iatrogenic retardation").
55. See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 460-61 (D.D.C. 1967), affd en
banc sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969)(striking down the
"tracking" system employed in Washington, D.C. public schools and noting the very
low rate of upgrading from the special academic track).
56. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(C) (Supp. V 1993) (requiring states to develop plans
to identify, locate and evaluate handicapped children to determine whether they are
in need of services); id. § 1412(5)(C) (addressing some of the problems of evaluation
using standardized testing); Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 21, at 24 (observing that
since the Act has been in effect and assessment techniques have improved, "teachers
are finding it more difficult to 'dump' children into special education"); see also supra
text accompanying note 48.
57. To be eligible for federal funds a state must establish:
procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, children with
disabilities, including children in public or private institutions or other care
facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled, and that special
classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from
the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity
of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily ....
20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
One of the Act's most notable failures is in its effort to integrate regular public
education classes. See Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1214 n.20 (3d Cir. 1993)
(indicating that, according to the U.S. Department of Education (DOE), "nearly
two-thirds of the state plans submitted for DOE approval in 1991 under the Act were
not in compliance with the mainstreaming requirements of IDEA") (citing DMSION
OF INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT, U.S. DEPT OF EDUC., To ASSURE THE FREE APPROPRIATE
PUBLIC EDUCATION OF ALL CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 119 (1992)).
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3. Secondary Exclusion-Legislation barring children from
the schools, misuse of the special education system, poorly
designed testing measures, and misdiagnosis all result in what
I have termed "primary" or "initial" exclusion. There is, however,
another form of exclusion from educational benefits to be
considered. If recovery from developmental disability were
possible through the provision of appropriate programming,
58
then a failure to provide such programming is as much an
exclusion from educational opportunity as misplacement caused
by misassessment or bigotry. The failure to provide program-
ming which is needed to permit recovery can be termed
"secondary exclusion."
The issue which must then be confronted directly is the
significance of a diagnosis of mental retardation, either alone
or as part of some other disabling condition. 59 Opinions range
across a continuum. At one extreme is the "passive-acceptant
approach." One author has described this approach as follows:
The passive-acceptant approach basically reflects the more
or less overt assumption that the retarded individual is
essentially unmodifiable and, therefore, that his perfor-
mance level as manifested at a given stage of, his devel-
opment is considered as a powerful predictor of his future
adaptation. Strategies aiming at helping him to adapt...
will consist of molding the requirements and activities of
his environment to suit his level of functioning, rather than
making the necessary efforts to raise his level of functioning
in a significant way. This, of course, is doomed to perpetuate
his low level of performance."0
At the other extreme is the "active-modificational approach."
Underlying this approach is the following assumption:
58. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
59. In most cases, autistic individuals are also diagnosed as mentally retarded.
See AMERICAN sI TRIC ASS'N, DIAGN0gnC AND STATI- PICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
35 (3d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM III-R]. According to Dr. Gary Mesibov, co-director
of Division TEACCH, about 70% of autistic children function in the retarded range.
See Gary B. Mesibov, Autism, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN BIOLOGY 505,507 (1991).
There is, however, a significant question as to the reliability of IQ testing in the case
of autistic children. See Lovaas & Smith, supra note 9, at 289 (noting that autistic
children's IQ scores may not be reliable where they are noncompliant during testing).
60. Reuven Feuerstein, A Dynamic Approach to the Causation, Prevention, and
Alleviation of Retarded Performance, in SOCIAL-CuLTURAL ASPECmS OF MENTAL RETARDATION
341, 343 (H. Carl Haywood ed., 1970).
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Given the proper social, cultural, and educational policy
based on the theoretical framework of the human organism
as an open system and further, given an investment in the
creation of daring, innovatory strategies, retarded perfor-
mance levels can be raised considerably. The observed
low-level performance of the retardate is not accepted as
a status quo nor perceived as a fixed ceiling of his capacity,
nor as a rigid predictor of his future social and occupational
adjustment. The retardate himself, his family, and his
educators are helped to realize that society has every
expectation that the retardate will be able to perform more
adequately and, further, that society will make every effort
to see that these expectations are realized. This is quite
opposed to the situation that often occurs when psycholo-
gists, counselors, and teachers feel it is their duty to
"prepare" the retardate and his parents for acceptance of
the fact of retardation and for the futility inherent in
making unrewarding efforts to raise the child's performance
level.6
The idea that intellectual functioning could be improved by
educational programming is not new. As early as 1909, Alfred
Binet, having developed the "intelligence test," suggested that
intelligence could be improved by a method he called "mental
orthopedics." 2 During the next fifty years, there were periodic
attempts to demonstrate that IQ test results could be increased
significantly if appropriate programming were provided.63
Although studies often showed success, even dramatic success
at times, they met with little enthusiasm within the scientific
community.64
61. Id. at 345.
62. ALFRED BINET, MODERN IDEAS ABouT CHILDREN 105-18 (Suzanne Heisler trans.,
1975). Binet's views that intelligence could be improved, however, were not widely
followed. Samuel A. Kirk, Research in Education, in MENTAL RETARDATION: A REVIEW
OF RESEARCH 68 (Harvey A. Stevens & Rick Heber eds., 1964) ("American psychologists
and educators reacted enthusiastically to the testing movement initiated by Binet.
Few, however, followed Binet's ideas on the educability of intelligence. Instead, there
arose a pessimistic attitude toward the training of intelligence.").
63. A summary of some of the better known studies is provided in Kirk, supra
note 62, at 67-72. See also Feuerstein, supra note 60, at 351-52.
64. As one commentator explained:
There are many reasons for the paucity of such studies. One reason has been
the prejudice against the possibility of developing intelligence through educational
procedures. Another reason is related to the length of time needed to produce
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The striking results of the Lovaas research have again placed
the two philosophies underlying developmental disabilities at
center stage, and the Lovaas-TEACCH controversy places the
basic assumptions underlying those philosophies in stark
contrast. TEACCH's adherents rely on a passive-acceptant
model and strenuously resist the competing approach.6" If the
active-modificational approach of Lovaas is correct,6 6 almost
half of the autistic children who are placed in Division
TEACCH programming are being deprived forever of a normal
life.67
Because the passive-acceptant approach adopted by
TEACCH and others produces self-fulfilling prophecies, it is
critical not to err on the side of that approach since such error
would be the functional equivalent of misassessment. The
opportunity to catch up necessarily will be lost.6" Further-
more, there is simply no way to strike a compromise between
the two competing programs by adding a few additional hours
per week of programming, since the provision of a small
reliable results. A third reason is that the factors of control, attrition, and
reliability of measurement tend to discourage experimenters from launching a
controlled longitudinal experiment of an educational nature.
Kirk, supra note 62, at 72.
65. For example, authors implicitly relying on this model have explained their
assumptions about autistic children as follows:
[O]ur first assumption has always been that anyone diagnosed as autistic in
childhood continues to be so as an adult, even though changes and considerable
improvement may have occurred. This is consistent with most current definitions
of autism, suggesting that it is pervasive and lifelong, and that these clients
frequently improve though rarely are cured.
Mary E. Van Bourgondien & Gary B. Mesibov, Diagnosis and Treatment ofAdolescents
and Adults with Autism, in AUTISM: NATURE, DIAGNOSIS, AND TREATMENT 367, 368
(Geraldine Dawson ed., 1989); see also Mesibov, supra note 59, at 507 (claiming that
70% of autistic individuals test in the retarded range "with IQ scores as stable as
those of nonhandicapped children and as accurate in predicting later academic
performance").
66. See Arnold Barnett, Misapplications Reviews: Dealing with Autism, INTERFACES,
May-June 1989, at 27, 31 (praising the Lovaas study and responding to criticisms of
the Lovaas program and the study's methodology); Lovaas & Smith, supra note 9, at
300 ("We do not allow the child to withdraw and be autistic, and parents and
treatment personnel are not encouraged to accept or respect the child's 'autism' or
'psychosis.' ").
67. See supra table 1 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 55 and infra note 180.
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number of hours of intensive programming has been shown
not to be beneficial.6 9
It is critical, therefore, to determine which assumption
guides the Act. Although the legislative history does not speak
directly to the issue, references to "full educational opportuni-
ties"7" and "maximum benefits to handicapped children,"'"
support the proposition that significant progress was seen as
achievable, -and imply a rejection of the passive-acceptant
model.72 The Congressional assertion that "[p]arents of
handicapped children all too frequently are not able to
advocate the rights of their children because they have been
erroneously led to believe that their children will not be able
to lead meaningful lives," provides further evidence that the
Act adopted the active-modificational model.73
The economic-efficiency considerations of the Act and the
expressed need to promote the dignity of the child also man-
date that the goal of special education placement should be
integration, or reintegration,74 into the regular classroom at
the earliest possible time. The long-term cost effectiveness of
intensive, early intervention is clear. In the case of behavioral
intervention for young autistic children, Dr. Lovaas noted
that:
Clients who achieved normal functioning could be reduced
from 40 hours per week to infrequent visits after 2 years
69. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. The Lovaas study found that
almost half of the children who received 40 hours per week of one-to-one behavioral
therapy recovered completely from their disability. Lovaas, supra note 14, at 5-7.
None of the children recovered who were in a control group that received 10 hours
per week of the same therapy. Id. Thus, there is no point in supplementing Division
TEACCH programs by providing a few hours of the behavioral training with the
expectation of getting some improvement. If one wants the result, one must provide
the entire program.
70. S. REP. No. 168, supra note 28, at 3, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1427.
71. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1430.
72. See Kruelle v. New Castle County Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 695 (3d Cir.
1981) (asserting that "[tihe language and the legislative history of the Act simply do
not entertain the possibility that some children may be untrainable").
73. S. REP. No. 168, supra note 28, at 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1433.
74. Currently, it would appear that fewer than five percent of the children
assigned to special education classes ever return to the regular education system.
See NATIONAL ASSN OF STATE BDS. OF EDuc., WNRS ALL A CALL FOR INCLUSrvE SCHOOLS
9 (1992) [hereinafter WINNERS ALL] (citing a 1989 study of 26 large cities by Gartner
& Lipsky); see also Kirp, supra note 53, at 749 ("In large city school systems, fewer
than one of every ten students assigned to special programs ever returns to regular
classes.").
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of treatment. Assigning one teacher for 2 years would cost
perhaps $40,000 (in 1987 dollars), in contrast to the
roughly $2,000,000 incurred by each client requiring a
lifelong stay in a restricted setting (an institution or other
residential placement). 5
This was precisely the argument made by Senators Stafford,
Javits, Kennedy, Schweiker, and Hathaway. They argued in
favor of including preschool programs for three- to five-year-
old children under the 1975 Act noting:
We are cognizant of the concerns of the States regarding
their financial capacity to provide a full educational
services [sic] to this group of children. Nevertheless, we
feel that it is imperative to point out that the benefits of
early identification and education, both in terms of pre-
vention of future human tragedy, and in the long-term
cost effectiveness of tax dollars, are so great as to justify
continued emphasis upon preschool education for handi-
capped children. 6
The 1986 Amendments to the Act77 reflected this belief, and
expanded funding to the states if they brought three- to five-
year-olds within their special education programs.78
The Act's insistence on promoting the dignity of the child is
perhaps an even more compelling argument in favor of finding
that the Act mandates an active-modificational approach to
programming. The symptoms of autism strip the severely
75. Lovaas & Smith, supra note 9, at 313-14; see also supra note 28 (discussing
the benefits of early education for disabled children).
76. S. REP. No. 168, supra note 28, at 81, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1479; see also Weicker, supra note 37, at 474 (criticizing proposed budget cuts).
77. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-457,
100 Stat. 1145 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
78. As a 1990 House Report explained:
The Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986 (Public Law
99-457)... significantly expanded the Act.... by requiring States to expand
preschool programs for children with disabilities from age 3 through age 5, with
the goal of serving all such children by no later than fiscal year 1991.... A
new part H . .. authorized Federal formula grants to States for the develop-
ment and implementation of statewide systems to provide early intervention
services for infants and toddlers with disabilities and their families.
H.R. REP. No. 544, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1723, 1724.
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afflicted individual of the very core of what it is to be a per-
son. Although this is partially a product of the cognitive
deficits commonly associated with the disorder,79 even more
devastating symptoms are: (1) a lack of communication skills
(both expressive and receptive), and (2) an inability to relate
to other people and to form interpersonal relationships."
Unless an active-modificational approach is adopted, these
children not only will be excluded from school, but also will be
excluded from the essence of human experience.
4. Avoidance of Secondary Exclusion: The Substantive
Appropriateness Standard-Whereas the IDEA addresses
explicitly the problem of primary exclusion through the use of
mandated integration, it does not similarly address the
secondary exclusion problem. In fact, the secondary exclusion
issue commonly is perceived to be resolved by the requirement
that the educational agency offer substantively appropriate
programming "to meet the unique needs of a child with a
disability."" The Act's failure to define "appropriate" in
educational or substantive terms is one of its major failures
and one of the leading causes of litigation under the Act.
8 2
Any discussion of a local educational agency's substantive
legal responsibility to provide programming must begin by
noting that section 1412(2) of the Act requires the provision of
a "free appropriate public education."83 Although section
1401(a)(18) of the Act purports to define a free appropriate
public education, 4 "[n]oticeably absent from the language of
the statute is any substantive standard prescribing the level
of education to be accorded handicapped children."85 Thus, it
79. But see supra note 59.
80. DSM III-R, supra note 59, at 34.
81. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16) (Supp. V 1993).
82. In addition to the "substantive appropriateness" of a proposed placement,
procedural compliance by the educational agency is often an issue. See Hendrick
Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1981) (noting that courts
inquiring into the appropriateness of a placement must first determine whether
there has been procedural compliance before determining substantive appropriate-
ness); Burlington v. Department of Educ., 736 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1984) (stating that
the question "whether a proposed IEP is adequate and appropriate ... has both
procedural and substantive components"), affd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 359
(1985).
83. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
84. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) (1988).
85. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189. The language of the statute is as follows:
The term "free appropriate public education" means special education and
related services that-
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has fallen to the courts to provide some substantive content to
the "appropriateness" requirement of the Act.
The most frequently cited and widely discussed pronounce-
ment on the subject is the Supreme Court decision in
Hendrick Hudson District Board of Education v. Rowley,8" a
case involving a bright, hearing-impaired child whose parents
wanted the district to provide a sign language interpreter in
the classroom.8 7 Although Rowley's special facts and the
Court's deliberate attempt to restrict its decision to those
facts makes it of limited authoritative significance," the case
provides a useful starting point in an attempt to give meaning
to the "appropriateness" requirement.
The Rowley Court was confronted with three choices in
seeking to define the extent of programming that must be
provided in order to satisfy the "appropriateness" requirement
of the Act. First, the Court had the choice to adopt a "maximi-
zation of potential" definition of appropriateness. Although
the majority rejected such a definition, a the dissent, written
by Justice White and joined by Justices Marshall and
Brennan, criticized the majority for constricting the Act's
requirements.90 The dissent argued that the legislative history
of the Act supported the lower court's conclusion that the Act
required states to provide disabled children with a "basic floor
of opportunity ... intended to eliminate the effects of the
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge,
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency,
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school
education in the State involved, and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program
required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) (1988).
86. 458 U.S. 176 (1981).
87. Id. at 185.
88. The Rowley court limited its opinion as follows:
We do not attempt today to establish any one test for determining the adequacy
of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act. Because
in this case we are presented with a handicapped child who is receiving
substantial specialized instruction and related services, and who is performing
above average in the regular classrooms of a public school system, we confine
our analysis to that situation.
Id. at 202.
89. Id. at 189-90.
90. Id. at 212-16 (White, J., dissenting).
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handicap .... .""9 Thus, the majority was unwilling to adopt
such a standard despite language in the legislative history of
the Act that supported it.
92
Second, the Court could have adopted a standard requiring
the education to be "of benefit" or "any benefit" to the disabled
student.93 Under this type of minimal programming approach,
as long as the programming provided by the public entity
provides a benefit in absolute terms, it satisfies the test.
Thus, for example, if a child is functioning at a twelve-month
level when she enters the program, and one year later has
attained a thirteen-month level, the program would be
"appropriate" within the meaning of this standard.94 Under
this approach, it would be irrelevant that with a different
program, the same child might have attained a twenty-four-
or thirty-month level within the same time period. Perhaps
more importantly, even if recovery were conceded to be possi-
ble, the public entity would not be required to provide the
programming which would lead to that recovery.95
91. Id. at 215 (White, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 189-90; see supra notes 70, 71 and accompanying text. The federal
substantive standard of"appropriateness" is a minimum standard only. See B.G. ex
rel. F.G. v. Cranford Bd. of Educ., 702 F. Supp. 1140, 1148 (D.N.J. 1988), affd, 882
F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1989). Some states have enacted legislation which would appear to
require maximization in programming, or at least something more than that
required under Rowley. See generally Conklin v. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ.,
946 F.2d 306, 316-21 (4th Cir. 1991) (discussing state legislation).
93. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected this inter-
pretation in Board of Educ. v. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1986). The Court
stated:
The School District's "of benefit" test is offered in defense of an educational
plan under which educational regression actually occurred. Literally the School
Board's plan might be conceived as conferring some benefit to Andrew in that
less regression might occur under it than if Andrew Diamond had simply been
left to vegetate. The Act, however, requires a plan likely to produce progress,
not regression or trivial educational advancement.
Id. at 991 (citing Hall v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 636 (4th Cir.
1985)); see also cases cited supra note 92.
94. This assumes, of course, that the one month increase is attributable to the
program and is not just a result of the natural maturation process or supplementary
programming privately provided by the parents. See Johnson v. Lancaster-Lebanon
Intermediate Unit 13, 757 F. Supp. 606, 619 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (separating the effects
of private therapy from that of the IEP).
95. In my own case, this was the position taken by the Delaware County
Intermediate Unit. This position, however, was rejected by the Special Education
Due Process Appeals Review Panel, which reasoned:
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It seems unlikely that the majority in Rowley intended to
adopt such a minimal definition of "appropriateness." A better
interpretation is that the Court adopted a standard which
requires the provision of an educational program to allow a
child to make meaningful progress toward an attainable
goal.96 The goal itself will necessarily vary depending on the
individual child's potential or capacity. As one commentator
noted:
It might be contended that Rowley merely contemplates
that each handicapped child receive some net educational
benefit, without attempting to measure that benefit
against the child's individual goals and objectives. A much
stronger case can be made for a two-pronged approach,
however, since the EAHCA specifically provides that each
child's educational program is to be designed with his
individual needs in mind. If the sufficiency of the pro-
gramming to be provided is not similarly assessed with
the child's unique abilities, needs, and objectives in mind,
that requirement would be largely nugatory. The Rowley
decision itself specifically recognized that the "some
benefit" standard could only be applied after careful
consideration of each individual child's abilities, needs,
and objectives. Accordingly, a two-pronged analysis of the
substantive sufficiency of educational programming should
be employed: This analysis requires both careful examina-
tion of the child's abilities, needs, and objectives, and an
[Hiow could we neglect to find that the Lovaas program, with its potential for
mainstreaming and self-sufficiency by the time Paul reaches the primary
grades, and not the TEACCH program, which at its best envisions a lifetime of
special education ... is the appropriate program for Paul?
In re The Educational Assignment of Paul K., Special Education Opinion No. 568,
slip op. at 8 (Special Educ. Due Process App. Review Panel mailed June 2, 1992).
96. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192 (stating that access to public education must be
.meaningful"); see also Doe v. Alabama Dept. of Educ., 915 F.2d 651, 665 (11th Cir.
1990) (requiring more than de minimis educational benefits); Polk v. Central
Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 182-84 (3d Cir. 1988) (rejecting
a "some benefit" standard and adopting a "meaningful benefit" test); Hall v. Vance
County Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 636 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Clearly, Congress did not
intend that a school system could discharge its duty under the EAHCA by providing
a program that produces some minimal academic advancement, no matter how
trivial."); Chris D. v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 753 F. Supp. 922, 931 (M.D.
Ala. 1990) ("The court cannot agree.., that because Cory has learned something in
the last several years, he is therefore receiving an educational benefit from special
education.").
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assessment of whether he is receiving some educational
benefit as measured against those objectives.
97
The post-Rowley decisions have, in large part, supported the
interpretation that the Act requires the provision of services
which will permit the child to make progress which is mean-
ingful in view of the child's potential. 98 Even assuming,
however, that Rowley has provided some guidance in dealing
with the question of what is required under the Act from a
substantive, educational-programming perspective, definitional
problems remain. If progress along some type of continuum is
the legal requirement, the two-pronged standard of Rowley
does not address the issue of the amount of progress that is
required to meet the educational minimum.
97. Judith W. Wegner, Variations on a Theme-The Concept of Equal Education-
al Opportunity and Programming Decisions Under the Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act of 1975, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1985, at 169, 186
(1985).
98. See, e.g., Carter v. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four, 950 F.2d 156, 160 (4th
Cir. 1991) (affirming the district court's conclusion that an IEP with modest goals
"failed to satisfy the Act's requirement of more than minimal or trivial progress");
Conklin v. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ., 946 F.2d 306, 315-16 (4th Cir. 1991)
(rejecting the dispositive use of passing marks or grade advancement as criteria);
Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 184-85 (3d Cir.
1988) (requiring more than a de minimis benefit and stating that "the question
whether benefit is de minimis must be gauged in relation to the child's potential");
Johnson v. Lancaster-Lebanon Intermediate Unit 13, 757 F. Supp. 606, 620 (E.D. Pa.
1991) (rejecting an IEP because it was not "sufficiently tailored to [the child's]
individual needs"); Angevine v. Jenkins, 752 F. Supp. 24 (D.D.C. 1990) (considering
the unique needs of the child in assessing advancement), rev'd sub nom. Angevine v.
Smith 959 F.2d 292 (1992); School Dist. v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Educ., 547 A.2d 520,
522 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (determining a program to be inappropriate because it
failed to satisfy the individual child's needs); see also Jack Tweedie, The Politics of
Legalization in Special Education Reform, in SPECIAL EDUCATION POLICIES: THEIR
HISTORY, IMPLEMENTATION AND FINANCE 48, (Jay G. Chambers & William T. Hartman
eds., 1983), explaining:
Reformers wanted a free, appropriate, public education for all handicapped
children: no children would be turned away from schools, no fees would be
charged, and the child's expenses at a private school would be paid by the public
school if the latter did not offer a suitable program; and the child's education
program would be tailored to the child's unique needs. Many special education
programs classified and served children according to their primary handicapped
condition (e.g., mildly retarded, physically handicapped, blind). An education
appropriate to each child's needs encompassed the reformers' dissatisfaction
with gross classifications, poor testing procedures, and inadequate programs not
responsive to individual children's potentials.
Id. at 60-61.
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To say, as the Rowley majority did, that maximization is not
required, does not further the analysis substantially. After all,
the Act was passed in part in response to, or in furtherance
of, emerging case law which required that the disabled receive
equal educational opportunity.99 Inasmuch as the regular
public schools are not required to maximize students' poten-
tial, there is no reason to believe that better outcomes are
intended for disabled children than their non-disabled peers.100
The problem, however, is not without solution. Although by
no means a universal answer, the degree of progress in many
cases can be defined by reference to the Act's stated goal of
inclusion.'0 ' If a disabled child can reach the educational level
of an average, non-disabled peer, successfully leave special
education, be integrated into the regular public curriculum,
and thereafter pass from grade to grade, special education
should be substantively designed to attempt to achieve that
goal.0 2 This standard is mandated by both the "cost effective-
ness" and the "dignity of the child" underpinnings of the Act.
10 3
5. An Appropriate Program is One Designed to Lead to
Integration: Eliminating Tension Between the Substantive
Goals-A definition of substantive appropriateness such as the
one I am advancing will eliminate what is perceived commonly
as a tension or inconsistency between the integration and the
substantive appropriateness requirements of the Act. The
position that these requirements are fundamentally inconsis-
tent is one taken by Professor Martha Minow. She has written:
[Tihe legal framework for special education expresses the
difference dilemma. The EAHCA embodies an express
tension between its two substantive commitments to the
"appropriate education" and to the "least restrictive alter-
native." This tension invokes the choice between specialized
99. See Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Wegner, supra
note 97, at 171-72.
100. See supra note 21.
101. See Johnson v. Lancaster-Lebanon Intermediate Unit 13, 757 F. Supp. 606,
619 (E.D. Pa. 1991) ([Ulnder Rowley mainstreaming is one indication of whether a
handicapped child is receiving adequate benefits from his or her education."); supra
notes 56-57, 72-78 and accompanying text.
102. This definition, in my opinion, eliminates the potential for viewing the
disparate treatment of handicapped children and their non-disabled peers as
anything other than equal. Just as a sick child is given medical attention and then
sent back to school to join his or her classmates, whenever possible the disabled child
should receive highly intensive intervention and then join (or rejoin) the group.
103. See infra Part III.C.1.
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services and some degree of separate treatment on the one
side and minimized labeling and minimized segregation on
the other.1" 4
Professor Minow, however, bases her argument in large part
on an underlying assumption of permanence of disabilities.
10 5
Using children suffering from visual and auditory impairments
as examples, she notes that a better educational opportunity
may be provided in a specialized setting rather than in the
mainstream classroom.0 6 This model, however, does not
encompass the full range of children who come under the Act's
provisions because children with non-permanent disabilities
are excluded from this model.
To the contrary, the "appropriateness" requirement and
"integration" requirement actually complement each other
where short-term, intensive, special education can be designed
to allow disabled children to catch up to their non-disabled
peers and be educated in the regular classroom. This is
particularly true in the case of preschool children because they
are at an age at which their presence in a special program has
not yet become a stigmatizing event.' 7
Defining educational appropriateness by reference to the
integration goal-where a special education program is
appropriate if it is designed to lead to integration into the regu-
lar classroom-is entirely consistent with the view of the
Rowley Court. In Rowley, the Court held that "if the child is
104. Martha Minow, Learning to Live with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual
and Special Education, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1985, at 157, 181; see also
MINOW, supra note 22, at 35-39 (discussing the difference dilemma).
105. For a discussion refuting this assumption, see supra Part II.A.3.
106. MINOW, supra note 22, at 37-39; see also Kirk, supra note 62, at 57-61
(reporting the conclusions of studies comparing the achievement of mentally retarded
students in special and regular classes). Kirk noted that one researcher interpreted
a number of these studies to mean that "mentally handicapped children in special
[education] classes are emotionally better adjusted, have a higher regard for their own
mental ability, participate more widely in learning and social activities, and possess
more traits desired by their peers than do their counterparts in regular grades." Id.
at 59 (quoting T.G. THURSTONE, AN EVALUATION OF EDUCATING MENTALLY HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN IN SPECIAL CLASSES AND IN REGULAR GRADES 170 (1959). But see Oberti v. Board
of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1216 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[T]he court must pay special attention
to those unique benefits the child may obtain from integration in a regular classroom
which cannot be achieved in a segregated environment, i.e., the development of social
and communication skills from interaction with nondisabled peers.").
107. Although some tension exists between "substantive appropriateness" and the
integration requirement after the preschool level, the view that special education is
a temporary placement, not a determination of final status, will tend to minimize that
tension.
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being educated in the regular classrooms of the public educa-
tion system, [the program] should be reasonably calculated to
enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from
grade to grade."'0 8
A preschool program that permits a child to reach the first
grade is a necessary prerequisite to a test of appropriateness
which focuses on the school-aged child's ability to advance from
grade to grade.' °9 Furthermore, the Court in Rowley noted
specifically that "[c]hildren who graduate from our public
school systems are considered by our society to have been
'educated' at least to the grade level they have completed, and
access to an 'education' for handicapped children is precisely
what Congress sought to provide in the Act."110
III. ADJUSTING THE BALANCE OF POWER UNDER THE ACT:
THE PARENT-EDUCATOR CONFLICT
A. A Brief Background
There has always been a certain level of conflict in this
country regarding the allocation of decision-making power
within the context of the establishment of educational curric-
ulum and programming."' Recognizing that some level of
education is necessary to responsibly carry out the role of
citizen and voter, courts have long acknowledged that the state
has a legitimate interest in regulating educational program-
ming." 2 Nevertheless, ultimate control over the educational
108. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205 (1981).
109. See id. at 192 ("[T]he intent of the Act was more to open the door of public
education to handicapped children ... than to guarantee any particular level of
education once inside.").
110. Id. at 203.
111. See generally James C. Easterly, "Parent v. State": The Challenge to Compul-
sory School Attendance Laws, 11 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLY 83 (1990) (discussing the
conflict of interests between parent and state decision making).
112. See Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 130-31 (N.D.N.Y. 1988)
(discussing the state's interest in educating children and children's interest in
receiving an education). The state's interest in educating children was explained by
Justice Blackmun as follows:
[T]he Constitution presupposes the existence of an informed citizenry prepared
to participate in governmental affairs, and these democratic principles obviously
are constitutionally incorporated into the structure of our government. It
therefore seems entirely appropriate that the State use "public schools [to] ...
inculcat[e] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system."
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experience traditionally has remained primarily the preroga-
tive of the family and not the state.113
As a practical matter, the general principle of parental choice
has been limited by two factors. First, limited resources
necessarily restrict the range of programming options that can
be made available. 114 Second, the belief that educators have
superior knowledge regarding programming, may lead to
deference to their decisions." 5 This Part will show that in the
case of special education programming, neither of the foregoing
provides a compelling reason for vesting the decision-making
prerogative in the educational establishment." 6 The conclusion
that educators are not to be given the decision-making power
is supported by the history of parent-educator conflict both
before and after the enactment of the Act.
B. The Role of Procedural Protections Under the Act
1. Parental Empowerment-On even a casual review of the
Act, the pervasive Congressional insistence that parents be
involved in decisions affecting the educational placement of
their children is striking."7 Under the Act, the child's program
must be developed jointly by the educational agency and the
Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 876 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (alteration
in original) (quoting Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)).
113. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (finding that an Amish
parent was not obligated to comply with a state compulsory education law); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923) (striking down a statute banning the
teaching of any language other than English prior to the completion of eighth grade
because the statute was an impermissible attempt to "interfere . . . with the power
of parents to control the education of their own"); Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59 (1874)
("[Hiow it will result disastrously to the proper discipline, efficiency and well being
of the common schools, to concede this paramount right to the parent to make a
reasonable choice from the studies in the prescribed course which his child shall
pursue, is a proposition we cannot understand."). Many of the relevant cases are cited
and discussed in John G. Culhane, Reinvigorating Educational Malpractice Claims:
A Representational Focus, 67 WASH. L. REv. 349, 382-85 (1992).
114. See Stark, supra note 37, at 487-88.
115. The deference required by Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176, 207-08 (1981), was based on the relationship between the state and federal
governments, rather than any particular claim about educators' expertise.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 136-54.
117. According to one policymaker, the whole point of the IEP process was "to
strengthen the hands of parents .... It was a way of individualizing and
contractualizing the relationships and involving parents in the process .... It's a way
of enforcing what should be delivered to kids." Neal & Kirp, supra note 22, at 72 n.39
(quoting an unidentified interviewee).
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parents.11 In addition, procedural safeguards seek to ensure
that the educational unit does not act unilaterally unless the
parents, after notice, have abrogated their responsibility.1 9
In fact, the history of the Act makes it apparent that
policymakers viewed parental involvement in decisions affect-
ing the child as the primary means by which earlier abuses
were to be corrected. As one commentator observed:
The value of individualized planning depends on including
an effective advocate for the child in the planning process
and enforcing the child's plan. Policymakers recognized the
potentially adversary relationship between the school and
the child so they empowered parents to act in the child's
interest. Parents would represent the child in the IEP
meeting. An impartial hearing would resolve disagreements
between school officials and the parents. Parents could
request an independent education evaluation. The parent's
advocate role follows traditional conceptions of parental
authority, and policymakers presumed that parents would
be effective advocates.12 °
Such insistence on parental rights is hardly surprising in light
of the fact that the prime impetus for reform came from parent
groups.
Middle-class white parents of handicapped children led
the attack on exclusion from the educational system. They
demanded, and they partially got, the right to have the
education of their children recognized as a public responsi-
bility. Schools could no longer exclude their children just
because they did not belong, and, once admitted, the
children had the right to an adequate education, sufficiently
funded and staffed. Nonwhite and non-English-speaking
parents joined the coalition, in part with the same ends in
mind . .. but more often [because] . .. too many of their
children were being classified as handicapped and were
being channeled into special education programs with little
pretense that they would be educated.
121
118. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(19) (Supp. V 1993).
119. E.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(a), 1415(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1993).
120. Tweedie, supra note 98, at 61.
121. Lazerson, supra note 48, at 41.
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Although some professional special educators joined the
coalition pushing for the adoption of the Act, there has never
been a commonality of purpose or viewpoint between parents
and special educators. 22
The next section will demonstrate that the net result has
been a law which clearly embodies a principle of parental
participation, but that principle has met with pervasive oppo-
sition by members of the special education establishment.
2. Post-Act Parent-Educator Conflicts-Since the enact-
ment of the Act, much of the activity of the special educators
has focused on attempting to exclude parents from the
processes mandated by the Act. Educator resentment of
parental participation in the process of selecting and imple-
menting educational programming for disabled children is well
documented. 123 For example, numerous studies of Individual-
ized Education Program (IEP) conferences report that the
conferences do not function as envisioned by the drafters of
the Act.'24 Rather than a cooperative interaction between
122. Lazerson describes the historic mistrust between parents and the special
education establishment and notes that, although some special educators joined with
parents in lobbying for Pub. L. No. 94-142, "[p]rofessional special educators found
themselves caught in a particular dilemma. .... Parent participation might be
politically necessary, but it was also dangerous." Id. The difference in viewpoint
between parents and special educators was explained by Tweedie as follows:
Even as the scope of the special educators' involvement has increased so has
the outside control of their discretion. Parents have been given considerable say
over the education their child receives. Some advocates supported the procedural
safeguards because, "We felt we could not trust the professionals so we wanted
a procedure whereby the parents could say, 'No, I don't want my child classified
as retarded.'" Parents often disagree with professionals; their participation in
the IEP meeting and access to procedural safeguards puts them in a position to
make decisions that have, in the past, been left to special educators.
Tweedie, supra note 98, at 65-66 (citations omitted).
123. See Ronald K. Yoshida et al., Parental Involvement in the Special Education
Pupil Planning Process: The School's Perspective, 44 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 531,533
(1978) ("[Tlhe attitude data suggest the possibility that a decision making role for
parents during planning team meetings may face some strong opposition.").
124. See BUDOFF & ORENSTEIN, supra note 32, at 61-62 (discussing studies which
found that parents were not permitted to participate meaningfully at IEP conferences);
Sue Goldstein et al., An Observational Analysis of the IEP Conference, 46 EXCEPTIONAL
CHILDREN 278, 282 (1980) ("Of the 14 conferences observed, in only one instance was
the meeting actually devoted to specifying goals and objectives jointly between the
parent and educators. It is noteworthy that in this instance the father was a psycholo-
gist . . . ."); Yoshida et al., supra note 123, at 532 ("[Plarents are expected to provide
information to the planning team, but they are not expected to participate actively
in making decisions about their child's program.").
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educators and parents to design a program which will meet
the unique needs of the child, conferences have become "highly
formal, noninteractive, and replete with educational jargon."
125
Instead of cooperating with parents, educators frequently
attempt to manipulate parents into accepting programs for-
mulated in the parents' absence. In fact, studies have shown
that, although in theory the IEP is to be developed jointly at
the conference, it is almost always developed by the educa-
tional agency after a placement decision has been made.
126
The reasons for attempts to exclude parental participation
are twofold. First, there are institutional barriers to the
implementation of the Act. Institutions, such as local educational
agencies (LEAs) 121 or intermediate educational units (IUs),
128
frequently yield to the bureaucratic temptation to routinize
procedures. Individualized reports are replaced by checklists
or boilerplate reports; individualized assessments and program-
ming give way to broad, general classifications of children and
standardized programming. 129 Furthermore, bureaucracies are
125. Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 21, at 33. In these conferences, parents may
simply defer to educators.
Despite education professionals' long history of neglecting handicapped children
and misusing special education services, parents nonetheless "tend to trust the
placement and services recommended by the schools." This residual trust comes
in part from parents' traditional willingness to defer to professional educational
judgment, reinforced by many educators' studied resistance to any parental
input.
Id. (Citations omitted).
126. Id. at 33; see also Goldstein et al., supra note 124, at 281 (noting instances,
in their study of IEP development, in which teachers had written IEP's prior to the
parent-teacher conference). Non-compliance with the Act's requirements is common.
See infra note 197. Some courts, however, have been prepared to hold that the
exclusion of parents from the IEP process is, by itself, a sufficient basis for finding
that the program offered does not constitute a "free appropriate public education."
See, e.g., Spielberg v. Henrico County Pub. Schs., 853 F.2d 256, 259 (4th Cir. 1988)
("It ... violates the spirit and intent of the [Act], which emphasizes parental
involvement. After the fact involvement is not enough.').
127. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(8) (1988).
128. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(23) (Supp. V 1993).
129. Clune and Van Pelt describe this trend as follows:
One of the conspicuous failures of the Act was the ideal of an individually
appropriate education. What occurred instead was the establishment of routinized
special programs. Individualized programs fell victim to lack of technical
knowledge, budgetary constraints, and the needs of schools for routinized
procedures. As organizations with many functions, schools must be able to plan
for special education within a finite budget. The idea of a customized education
for every handicapped child violated these fundamental organizational precepts.
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frequently unwilling or unable to change even in the face of
evidence that it is in society's best interest that they do so.
130
Perhaps the best explanation for this institutional rigidity is
that offered by Professor Kirp. Discussing schools' continued
use of the practice of "sorting" children by ability levels long
after such practices were known to be educationally ineffective
and psychologically damaging, he observed:
To one unfamiliar with the ways in which schools operate,
that array of legal, political, and pedagogical criticism might
signal imminent and perhaps revolutionary change in
schooling practice, precipitated by political crisis, voluntary
school action, or judicial intervention. Yet change, though
devoutly to be wished, will not occur so readily.
As a generation of would-be educational reformers have
learned to their sorrow, long entrenched school practices
are not lightly tampered with. School teachers and admin-
istrators do not deliberately set out to act arbitrarily; their
behavior is at least convenient, and sometimes necessary
in light of the constraints placed upon them. That behavior
serves particular needs: to maintain order; to provide
tranquility for the majority; to define relationships among
school personnel, demarcating the boundaries that separate
teachers, counselors, and administrators. It is behavior
tested and found appropriate (or comfortable) over a consid-
erable period of time. Whether it is functional for the society
is almost beside the point; what matters is that it is func-
tional for the school as an institution. To the extent that
any bright new idea threatens to undermine this culture
of the school, it is for that reason suspect.
131
Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 21, at 53 (citations omitted); see also RICHARD A.
WEATHERLEY, REFORMING SPECIAL EDUCATION: POLICY IMPLEMENTATION FROM STATE LEVEL
TO STREET LEVEL 73 (1979) (discussing the tension between educating large numbers
of children and attending to each child's individual needs); Jane L. David & David
Greene, Organizational Barriers to Full Implementation of PL 94-142, in SPECIAL
EDUCATION POLICIES, supra note 48, at 115, 125-32 (discussing obstacles to implementing
the Act in a way which conforms with its spirit and intent).
130. See LEWIs A. COSER, CONTINUITIES IN THE STUDY OF SOCIAL CONFLICT 23 (1967)
(observing that "[tihe need for reliance on predictability exercises pressure towards
the rejection of innovation"); see also infra notes 136-41 and accompanying text
(discussing funding for special education services and who provides these services).
131. Kirp, supra note 53, at 794-95 (citations omitted).
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Of equal importance in limiting parental participation,
however, is a strong resentment by educators of the parental
right and power under the Act to challenge the educators' profes-
sional judgment.'32 The educators' response has often been to
seek consciously to circumvent the principle of parental involve-
ment which underlies the Act.133
C. Significance of Parent-Educator Conflict: Allocation
of Decision-Making Power
Although it is clear that the drafters' attempt to empower
parents under the Act has not worked as envisioned, this fact
does not respond to the question of whether, or to what extent,
courts should defer to the presumed expertise of the special
education establishment. In other words, if parents could truly
be given greater power to influence decisions, would this
accomplish the substantive goals of the Act more efficiently than
preserving the status quo or even returning to the status quo
ante? After all, the goal of equalizing the power of parents and
special educators was an instrumental one. It was to be a means
of accomplishing certain goals, not an independent goal in
itself.
134
The goals of the Act have been defined in terms of primary
and secondary integration for the purpose of promoting the
dignity of the child in a long-term cost-efficient manner.'35 Can
we realistically expect special educators to promote those goals
and protect the child's and society's best interest as defined in
terms of those goals? On the other hand, in view of limited
resources and a need to achieve measurable results, is it
132. MICHAEL S. KNAPP Er AL, CumnmTvE EFFECTS OF FEDERAL EDUCATION POICIES ON
SCHOOLS AND DISTRICTS 143 (1983) (educators disturbed by parental veto of program
proposals not because of potential financial burden on school system but because parents
can question educators' professional judgment successfully); see also James E. Gilliam
& Margaret C. Coleman, Who Influences IEP Committee Decisions?, 47 EXCEPTIONAL
CHILDREN 642 (1981) (noting that "parents are frequently left out of the assessment
process"); Goldstein et al., supra note 124, at 282 (finding that parents were not treated
as equal partners); Yoshida et al., supra note 123, at 532 (discussing results of a study
which found that professionals did not think parents should be directly involved in
planning their child's education).
133. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 24, 30, 120.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 101-03.
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workable to place the decision-making power in the hands of
parents?
1. Practical Limitations on Educators-As recognized by
the drafters of the Act, allocation of the decision-making power
to the educational agency would serve to frustrate the intent
of the Act.136 The dispute over programming for autistic children
serves to illustrate the institutional shortcomings of educational
agencies acting as decision makers. Providing a Lovaas-type
program or similar highly intensive and individualized
programming, while cost-effective in the long run, is very
expensive in the short .run."7 As long as the agency is
negotiating program funding on a yearly basis, 13 there may well
be an inability or an unwillingness to incur large expenses now,
when the savings will not be realized until two or three years
later.139 Furthermore, depending on the structure of the
particular state's educational agencies, the funding responsibility
for preschool special education programs may not be borne by
the same agency that provides services for school aged children
or disabled adults. 4 ° If this is the case, the preschool funding
agency will have to increase its expenditures while the savings
will inure to the benefit of a different agency.' 4 '
Although many courts have taken the position that costs are
either completely irrelevant... or only one of many factors
136. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
137. See supra text accompanying note 75.
138. In Pennsylvania, the Intermediate Unit annually negotiates a "mutually
agreed-upon written arrangement" (MAWA) with the Commonwealth's Department
of Education under which the Unit becomes responsible for the delivery of early
intervention services. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 875-304(a) (Supp. 1994).
139. For a general discussion of funding formulas for special education, see WINNERS
ALL, supra note 74, at 30-37. For example, until recently, the system in Pennsylvania
created a monetary incentive to take children out of the public schools and place them
in special education classes run by the Intermediate Unit. Id. at 33. Even if districts
began offering the Lovaas program tomorrow, it would be two to three years before
any savings were realized. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
140. The special education bureaucracy is often wholly distinct from regular
education. See WINNERS ALL, supra note 74, at 9 ("Rather than special education
supporting the general education system, the two commonly function in separate orbits
that may or may not be connected with actual student learning or the needs of the
child as a whole.").
141. See Barnett, supra note 66, at 31 (observing that "local school officials have
more incentive to worry about next year's budget than about costs to some state agency
several years hence").
142. See Kruelle v. New Castle County Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 695-96 (3d Cir.
1981); William S. v. Gill, 572 F. Supp. 509, 516 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Hines v. Pitt County
Bd. of Educ., 497 F. Supp. 403, 408 (E.D.N.C. 1980); D.S. v. Board of Educ., 458 A.2d
129, 139-40 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983).
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when choosing between two educationally-appropriate pro-
grams, 4 3 the reality of the decision-making process is very
different. Costs are a major consideration-sometimes the
primary consideration-for the educational agency. 144 In fact,
agencies knowingly may jeopardize a child's future well-being
by providing inappropriate programming which is less expen-
sive in the short term, even though quite costly in the long
term. 45 One researcher reported:
[A] private school placement for a particular child, while
indicated, would not be recommended because of the expense.
The core evaluation team's position would be that the child's
needs could be met within the public school system, although
the principal very vocally opposed the return of the child
to his school. System A also maintained an unofficial quota
for private school placements. They sought to avoid a private
placement unless a child already in a private school could
be returned to the public school, thereby opening up a slot.'46
Furthermore, as noted earlier, institutions are often resistant
to change. 47 The prior existence of a TEACCH program, for
example, may be seen by cost-conscious administrators as
sufficient justification for continuing to utilize the TEACCH
143. See, e.g., Clevenger v. Oak Ridge Sch. Bd., 744 F.2d 514, 517 (6th Cir. 1984).
See generally Larry Bartlett, Economic Cost Factors in Providing a Free Appropriate
Public Education for Handicapped Children: The Legal Perspective, 22 J. L. & EDUC.
27 (1993) (reviewing decisions discussing cost as a factor in determining the appropri-
ateness of an educational program).
144. See BUDOFF & ORENSTEIN, supra note 32, at 186-87.
145. One administrator acknowledged:
If I have to sign a bill that someone gets therapy or goes to the [private] school,
it's like it's my money, because that's the kind of flak I get. And if I don't watch
the treasury, it's my neck that's in a noose. So I become paranoid about the
money almost. And so when things get going [at an appeals hearing], it's like
"gotta win." I gotta protect that coffer.... It becomes a very personal extension
of ourselves. As an administrator, you become the program and vice versa. ...
The task becomes to win-to win a battle, as opposed to coming up with what's
best for the child-somehow, we've lost that in the process.
Id.; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, The Role of Cost in Educational Decisionmaking
for the Handicapped Child, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1985, at 7, 8 ("A school
district may understand that certain services sought by parents on behalf of a
handicapped child would be extremely beneficial to the child, but nevertheless be
concerned about -the resource implications of those services.").
146. WEATHERLEY, supra note 129, at 85.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 130-31.
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methodology, rather than investigating newly developed
methodologies. 48
While the Act attempts to deal with this problem by requir-
ing professionals such as school psychologists to remain current
in their field,'49 this solution is inadequate because the individ-
uals with the expertise within the educational entity may have
little or no input in selecting the program to be offered. 50 That
function is often performed at the administrative level by
individuals who may have little exposure to the children who
are to be served.151 At the administrative level, short-term cost
considerations may be paramount even if administrators are
familiar with more effective types of programming.'52 Addition-
ally, since neither state nor federal legislation requires local
educational agencies to assess the effectiveness of their pro-
grams in any systematic fashion,'53 simple institutional inertia
148. In my own case, the Delaware County IU viewed the fact that TEACCH
methodology was 25 years old as a factor which justified its continued use. I, of course,
viewed the program as hopelessly outdated in view of the programming advances which
had been achieved during that period of time. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying
text.
149. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(3)(B)(i)-(iii) (Supp. V 1993).
150. For example, in my case, the school psychologist member of the
multidisciplinary evaluation team, having recommended placement in the TEACCH
program, later sought to distance herself from that recommendation by disclaiming
any personal involvement in the original decision to implement a TEACCH program.
Deposition of Dr. Terry Pomper at 87-88, Delaware County Intermediate Unit No.
25 v. Martin K., 831 F. Supp 1206 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (No. 92-3866) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
151. The state is required to institute "procedures for adopting, where appropriate,
promising practices, materials, and technology." 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(3)(B)(iii) (Supp.
V 1993). Nevertheless, it can be very difficult to have agencies develop any new
programming.
[A]lthough assessments for handicapping conditions are objective in theory, in
practice, the LEA's [local education agency's] resources influence eligibility
criteria and placement recommendations. A strong tendency exists for LEA's to
assess a child only if the child's disability fits a preexisting special education
program, or to find that the child's assessment happens to fit the child into an
existing program.
Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 21, at 28 (citations omitted).
152. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
153. Alan Gartner & Dorothy K. Lipsky, Beyond Special Education: Toward a
Quality System for All Students, 57 HARV. EDuc. REV. 367, 367 (1987) ("[D]ata
concerning children who had been certified as handicapped and have returned to
regular education ... are not required in State Plans nor has the Office of Special
Education Programs collected them in any other survey.") (quoting Letter from
Patricia J. Guard, Deputy Director, Office of Special Education Programs, U.S. Dept.
of Educ., to Alan Gartner (Nov. 7, 1986)).
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may result in utterly ineffectual programming being offered
year after year without triggering a program review.
1 54
Aside from cost, institutional inertia, lack of professional input
into program selection, and lack of legislation requiring that
programs be reviewed for effectiveness, there is a more funda-
mental problem. Because so many special educators have adopted
a passive-acceptant approach, they have no real expectation that
children will make significant progress. Thus, minimal progress
meets expectation levels and programs are not changed.
In large part, the minimal expectations problem was exac-
erbated by the Court's decision in Rowley. Rowley's failure to
require potential maximization 155 and the opinion's overall lack
of clarity were taken by many educational agencies as a judicial
grant of permission to utilize a minimal programming standard.'56
Given the factors noted above, many agencies have been more
than willing to so limit the programming made available. 5 '
Given the fact that educators typically have greater familiarity
with the range of available programming options than parents,
an inclination to delegate the decision-making power to the
educator may be understandable. This would be a more plausible
approach, however, if parents and educators were both consciously
154. Although 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1993) requires the local or
intermediate agency to submit educational achievement data to the state, there is no
reason to believe that individual agencies charged with the day-to-day programming
decisions are acting on the basis of any test data thereby generated. See supra notes
127-31 and accompanying text (discussing institutional inertia). In my own case, for
example, when the assistant executive director of the IU was deposed, he was asked
whether the IU ever attempted to determine statistically whether their programs were
working. He responded as follows:
Well, the last few years with the Early Intervention Department in Harrisburg,
they would send out surveys through the course of the year, and they would look
for information of numbers of students going into different programs and
whether they moved into regular programs or whether they moved on to other
programs. I would imagine there would be some information there that would
shed some light on that.
Deposition of Dr. Harry J. Jamison, Jr. at 38-39, Delaware County Intermediate Unit
No. 25 (No. 92-3866) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
155. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
156. See BUDOFF & ORENSTEIN, supra note 32, at 57 ("We asked parents to agree or
disagree that 'School personnel tried to sell me on an educational plan by misrepresenting
the severity of my child's problems.' Most parents agreed (65%).").
157. Clune &Van Pelt, supra note 21, at 28 ("The most objective and accurate testing
program cannot overcome inadequate resources."); see also BUDOFF & ORENSTEIN, supra
note 32, at 80 (AMlost parents did not see the school systems as acting in good faith.
Educational planning teams were seen as recommending programs more because they
were cheaper and available than because they would be appropriate.").
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seeking to achieve the same goal. Unfortunately, this is simply
not the case. Conscientious parents of disabled children want
to maximize their child's prospects. Regardless of the existence
of a public-educational policy not based on a maximization of
potential, parents should be free to provide maximizing programs,
either by supplementing the public program offered or by privately
providing a different program. At the very least, parents should
have a right to be told about existing programming options.
Under the Act and supporting state legislation, there is an
elaborate procedural mechanism charging the state with the
responsibility for evaluating the child15 and communicating the
results of that evaluation and proposals for programming to
parents.' There is, however, no requirement that the educational
entity disclose to parents that the educational program which
they have formulated is the minimum required by law. The
educational agency is only required to ensure the availability
of alternative placements or programming which "meet the needs
of children with disabilities for special education and related
services." 6 ° Furthermore, even if the agency is aware of such
programs, it is not required to advise parents of their existence.
The net result of Rowley has been that parents may not be
fully informed during the IEP meeting in which educators often
describe "their" programs as "appropriate" without mentioning
alternatives or disclosing how they are defining "appropriate."''
There are a number of sources of this miscommunication and
deception. First, the integration goal of the Act is frequently
ignored by educators.'62 Second, and arguably most important,
is the widespread misconception within the educational commu-
nity that Rowley requires only the provision of a program that
will result in "any progress" without reference to the child's
potential.'63 Thus, the confusion engendered by Rowley regarding
158. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
159. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)(1)(C)(iii), § 1414(a)(7) (1988).
160. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.551 (1993). In theory, the local agency must offer a range
of placement options. In practice, it appears more common that districts adopt the "one
size fits all" approach condemned by the dissent in Fuhrmann v. East Hanover Bd.
of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031, 1046 (3d Cir. 1993) (Hutchinson, J., concurring and dissenting).
161. See Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 21, at 34 (discussing a study which found
that, at the IEP conference, "educators do not raise the touchy issues, such as placement
options, potential social stigma, or possible harmful effects of proposed placements")
(citing SUZANNE THOUVENELLE ET AL., STUDY OF PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINIG THE LEAST
RESTUCrVE B ONMENr (110 PtAcEMENT OF HANDCAPPED CQHDEN: FNAL PROJECt REPoEF
7.67-7.9 (1980) (ERIC Doc. No. 199981)).
162. See supra note 57.
163. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text; see also Fuhrmann, 993 F.2d
at 1046 (Hutchinson, J., concurring and dissenting).
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the "appropriateness" standard results frequently in program-
ming which, at its best, is minimally adequate. Finally, school
district personnel are not required to inform parents of the long
range goals of the program that they are offering.164 Parents
are typically unfamiliar with the technical legal standard. Thus,
they assume frequently that when school officials assert that
a certain program is "appropriate" for a given child, it means
the "best" for that child or at least roughly comparable to pro-
gramming which can be obtained privately.6 5
2. Practical Limitations on Parents-Parents better under-
stand their child's abilities and potential than a professional
who typically makes judgments based on very brief acquaintance
with the child. In addition, parents have greater incentive to
ensure the best placement. Yet, many parents lack the expertise
necessary to make programming decisions. Thus, unrestricted
delegation of programming decisions to parents is also unwork-
able. Even parents who are personally willing to educate their
children are unable to take into account some appropriate long-
range cost considerations.
166
More importantly, parents are frequently incapable ofjudging
outcomes. Those with extremely high levels of expectation may
well be disappointed with an outcome which is in reality quite
good. More commonly, parents are too accepting of poor outcomes,
tending to praise even poor programming, 167 since they lack the
164. The Act's regulations requires only that a new IEP be prepared annually. 34
C.F.R. § 300.552 (1993). The IEP must contain a "statement ofannual goals, including
short-term instructional objectives." Id. § 300.346.
165. It is perhaps the discovery that the evaluators were only attempting to provide
the minimum permitted under the Act as interpreted by Rowley that leads to such
fierce animosity in those rare cases in which parents do their homework and
independently learn that there are programs which will provide a benefit far greater
than that offered by the public entity. Available research seems to confirm this. See
BUDOFF & ORENSTEIN, supra note 32, at 63-65.
166. A related problem arises where the parents' desires and the child's best interests
are at odds. For example, what if parents can no longer cope with a child, and seek
an expensive residential placement when the child's best interests (educationally) can
be served by a day program? See Stark, supra note 37, at 512 (discussing the response
of hearing officers to this question).
167. H.I. Walter & S. K Gilmore, Placebo versus Social Learning Effects in Parent
Training Procedures Designed to Alter the Behavior of Aggressive Boys, 4 BEHAV. THERAPY
361 (1973). Thus, according to one author:
It is important to demonstrate that autistic children benefit from a treatment
program, because some dubious treatments have had enthusiastic followings for
many years. For example, Bettelheim (1987), whose psychoanalytic milieu therapy
has long been known to be unhelpful for autistic children, recently reported high
enthusiasm for his program, with 20 times more applicants than available positions
in it.
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awareness of what constitutes good programming.16 ' As one father
of an autistic child argued:
I have met many Boston parents who are satisfied with the
instruction their autistic children are getting. A father might
proudly point out that (say) this year young John uses a spoon
whereas last year he did not.
No one would want to deprive such a parent of any thoughts
that give him solace. But two questions that he does not seem
to have considered are: (1) How much progress would young
John have made even without the program? and (2) How
much progress might John have made under optimal
conditions?6 9
In short, both lack of expertise and inability to judge outcomes
militate against vesting sole decision-making power in parents.
3. General Principles of the Decision-Making Process-Once
one accepts that, as a practical matter, there are significant
limitations on both parents' and educational agencies' abilities
to act as decision makers, it is necessary to establish the general
principles which should guide the decision-making process. The
primary principle is the maximization of accuracy in providing
intensive programming to those who can benefit. A necessary
corollary is that uncertainty must be resolved in favor of the
child. These principles can be derived from the goals underlying
the Act itself.
It is readily apparent that the Act's goal of long-term cost
effectiveness will be furthered by determining accurately which
children have the capacity to be integrated into the public schools
Tristram Smith, Concerns about Nonspecific Factors in the Treatment of Developmental
Disabilities, 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 657,657 (1988) (citing Bruno Bettelheim, The Therapeutic
Milieu, in THE EVOLUTION OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 222 (J.K. Zeig ed., 1987).
168. See Garry D. Brewer, Direction: The Coordination of Social Services, in SPECIAL
EDUCATION POLICIES, supra note 48, at 174 ("[Flamilies are at best uninformed consumers;
at worst, they are operating under personal, emotional, and financial stress, ignorant
of the range of opportunities from which they might choose. Few know enough about
what is required, what is available, and how to make the connections between needs
and resources.") (citing Kahn, infra, at 15-24); Alfred J. Kahn, Public School Services
The Next Phase-Policy and Delivery Strategies, 30 PUB. WELFARE, Winter 1972, at 15-24
(noting that parents have little information about available programs and which of
those programs is appropriate); see also supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text
(noting parents' common reliance on suggestions of educators).
169. Barnett, supra note 66, at 31. Precisely the same problem arose in the outcome
study conducted on TEACCH programming. One of the primary measures used to assess
the effectiveness of the program was parental satisfaction. See Schopler et al., supra
note 6, at 264-66.
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and providing those children with the intensive, short-term
intervention which will result in that integration. Conversely,
the efficiency goal will be compromised to the extent that
expensive programming is provided to children who will not
benefit from it. 170 Thus, whatever rules and guidelines are to
drive the decision-making process must be rooted fundamentally
in maximizing the accuracy of matching programming to students.
In turn, accuracy requires maximizing the quality and quantity
of information which goes into the placement decision. The
relevant information will deal with both individual capacity and
programming effectiveness.
The second goal of the Act, promotion of the individual child's
dignity, will be furthered by minimizing the extent to which
children who can substantially benefit from programming are
denied access to it. Since errors will be inevitable, uncertainty
must be resolved in favor of providing the programming. While
the unsuccessful provision of intensive programming reduces
overall cost-effectiveness, deprivation of programming to a child
who could have recovered fully would produce an even greater
cost, essentially sacrificing that child's life. Such a massive insult
to the dignity of that child cannot be permitted.
While obtaining information about programming will be largely
the responsibility of the educational agencies, complete disclosure
of programming options to parents is essential if the post-Rowley
abuses are to be eliminated. 17' In other words, full disclosure
170. See supra table 1 (summarizing the findings of Lovaas's 1987 study of the effects
of early intensive therapy on integration).
171. This is not to say, of course, that all parents wish to be informed. Some parents
do not see their role as requiring such knowledge, preferring instead to defer to the
expertise of the educational agency. One parent of a disabled child expressed this view,
stating: "I don't think I'm in a place to judge whether or not he's receiving the right
thing.... Getting him up, getting him dressed, and sending him to school. That's my
job." David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities: Educational Rights
and the Construction of Difference, 1991 DUKE L.J. 166, 190 (quoting Interview with
Rachel Dolan (Oct. 27, 1987)). As Professor Handler has noted, the theoretical "vision
[ofi shared decisionmaking" is the same in the doctor-patient relationship as in the
educator-parent relationship. Handler, supra note 22, at 1004. In such a model:
The doctor brings to the patient medical knowledge and judgment; the patient
brings personal values. The law imposes on the doctor the duty of providing
information, thus equalizing the relationship and enabling the patient to exercise
judgment intelligently and rationally. The patient is to be sufficiently empowered
so as to become an autonomous participant. The physician and patient share
information and carefully explore alternatives; they share the burdens of
decisionmaking. While they are bonded in their joint interests, they respect each
other's autonomy.
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of programming alternatives acts as an essential check on the
system in several ways. First, presentation of the full range of
programs considered will require evaluation teams to keep
current on new treatment programs and methodologies. Second,
increased awareness of new programs may lead professionals
to the conclusion that new programs may be less costly and more
effective than existing ones. As a result, professionals may adopt
new programs or modify existing ones. Third, a disclosure
requirement will force educators to acknowledge both to
themselves and to parents that the program that they might
otherwise have proposed is less effective than available alterna-
tives. Under these circumstances, professional pride should create
a strong incentive for educators to seek to exert their influence
within the bureaucracy to have new programs implemented.
Finally, to the extent that a limitation on parental decision-
making power can be justified by the greater expertise commonly
possessed by educational agency personnel, a disclosure require-
ment would, in effect, force the educators to educate the parents,
thereby reducing the disparity in expertise and lessening the
force of the justification.
D. Application of these Principles in Light of the
Potential for Continuing Conflicts
Although utilizing an integration standard to define educa-
tional or substantive "appropriateness," particularly in the
context of preschool programs, will help eliminate conflict
between parents and educators, it is likely that disagreements
will continue to occur routinely.172
Defining "appropriateness" in terms of integration eliminates
dispute as to the broad, general outline of appropriate education
and eliminates conflict arising from incompatible basic
assumptions as to the educability of children.173 Minimal
Id. Ideally, this is how things should work. As Professor Handler argued, in practice,
it may break down into manipulation of the weaker party by the more powerful to
accomplish an undisclosed agenda. As a result, "instead of patient self-determination
and meaningful dialogue, there is domination." Id. at 1005.
172. After all, agreement on a definition will not eliminate institutional rigidity
or educator resentment toward parental involvement in the process. See supra notes
127-33 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 60-61.
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programming not aimed at secondary integration would not meet
the definition of appropriateness. Programs such as TEACCH
which assume the inevitability of disability 74 or the immutability
of IQ scores could not be utilized until such time as it has been
demonstrated that a child has failed to respond to intensive
intervention.
1. Assessment of Capacity and Program Selection: Decisions
in the Face of Uncertainty-Ignoring, for the moment, the
question of conflicts regarding implementation of a given
program, it remains clear that disagreements will arise as to
the assessment of an individual child's capacity for integration
or for "meaningful progress" short of full integration in those
cases in which complete integration cannot be accomplished.
175
Furthermore, there may well be disagreements between parents
and educational agencies as to which of several methodologies
should be selected in light of the child's particular needs and
capacities.
(a) The Present Status of Such Disputes-Currently, when
disputes regarding a child's capacity for integration arise, the
initial placement recommendation is made by the educational
agency.176 Parents who can afford a private placement have the
option of rejecting the agency's proposal. Parents who cannot
afford a private placement do not have this option. They have
no choice but to accept the public placement while utilizing the
due process procedures of the Act to obtain a determination that
the proposed placement was not educationally appropriate.
177
If it is ultimately determined that the proposed placement was
174. See supra notes 10-12, 60, 65 and accompanying text.
175. One commentator described the importance of assessment as follows:
The first prong of this test-examination of the child's abilities, needs, and
objectives-is particularly critical. In the absence of careful and accurate judgments
on these issues, the second-stage inquiry into benefit derived will be based upon
an incorrect benchmark, virtually assuring that the child will not receive an
.appropriate" education. Thus, if a child's goals and objectives are set at a very
modest level as a result of an incorrect diagnosis of mental retardation or an
erroneous assessment of the extent to which his mental capacity is impaired,
an inquiry into his attainment of the established goals would fail to ensure that
he has, in fact, received educational programming which "meets his unique needs."
Wegner, supra note 97, at 186.
176. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(bXIXC) (1988). In Pennsylvania, in fact, the placement proposal
is made by the evaluation team. Although parents are members of the team, they are
invariably outnumbered by the representatives of the agency.
177. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(2), 1415 (c), 1415(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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inappropriate, the parent who placed the child privately can
seek reimbursement. 7 ' The parent who was forced to place the
child in the inappropriate public program against her better
judgment has no remedy other than "compensatory education." 79
In cases where there was only a brief window of opportunity
for integration, however, compensatory education will serve little
if any purpose.18 1 When such disagreements arise, there must
be a way of resolving them quickly, particularly when the parents
do not have the means to utilize a private placement.
In any event, some courts have taken the view that the
appropriateness of the agency's proposed placement must be
assessed as of the time when it was suggested. In other words,
courts may ignore anything that might have been learned about
the child's capacity through his actual experience in a private
or public placement.' 8 ' Thus, the hearing officer or the court
attempts to determine whether the placement decision appeared
appropriate based solely on what was known at the time of the
IEP rather than what should have or could have been known
at the time of the IEP or was learned later.
82
Clearly such an approach will violate the accuracy maximizing
principle and fail to promote either the dignity of the child or
the goal of long-range cost effectiveness. Promotion of these goals
178. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361 (1993); Burlington
Sch. Comm. v. Massachusetts Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985); Jefferson County
Bd. of Educ. v. Breen, 853 F.2d 853 (11th Cir. 1988).
179. See Breen, 853 F.2d at 857 (finding an award of compensatory education to
be appropriate where the board of education failed to provide a child with an appropriate
education prior to a court order); Meiner v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 753-54 (8th Cir.
1986) (holding that where plaintiff's father could not afford to pay for the placement
he considered appropriate, and so did not have any expenses, the proper remedy was
compensatory education).
180. The assumption here is that there are "critical stages" in intellectual develop-
ment. This concept "holds that educative efforts or retraining prior to or at these critical
stages will be most effective in bringing about reversibility of retarded performance."
Feuerstein, supra note 60, at 350-51.
This theory has been widely, though not universally, adopted in this country and
forms the basis for emphasizing preschool programs. For example, the Pennsylvania
Department of Education has directed Intermediate Units to consider preschoolers
eligible for expanded summer programming, noting that "[e]xperts generally agree
that the first five years are critical in the development of the child. These years evidence
the most rapid periods of development during the human lifespan." JOSEPH F. BARD,
PENNSYLvANIA DEPT. OF EDUC., BASIC EDUCATION CIRCULARS #23-92A-135 (1992) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
181. See, e.g., Fuhrmann v. East Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031, 1040 (3d
Cir. 1993) (stating that "the measure and adequacy of an IEP can only be determined
as of the time it was offered to the student, and not at some later date").
182. Id. at 1038-39.
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requires that decisionmakers have maximum information about
the child's capacity in formulating the IEP. The goals of the Act
are not furthered when decisionmakers deliberately disregard
information about the child which can be easily obtained. The
Act must be implemented in a manner which will minimize the
possibility that a child's capacity will be underassessed.' 8 ' Under-
assessment furthers no interest and encourages the educational
agency to make decisions based on minimal information.
(b) A Proposal for Solving the Initial Classification and
Program Selection Problem-Trial Placement-The question of
assessing capacity is partially a function of the formal testing
process utilized in formulating the child's IEP. Thus, no one
questions the need to develop accurate tests, train the test
administrators, and eliminate racial and cultural bias in both
the tests and administrators of those tests.184 More importantly,
if one accepts that IQ testing yields a measure of present
functioning level, then tests are not accurate predictors of
ultimate outcome for many children," 5 and some process should
be devised to decrease the risk of misplacement caused by
misassessment. The case of autistic children is instructive.
Initial progress in intensive, behavioral programming is the
best indicator of whether such programming might ultimately
lead to integration or significant improvement.8 6 Thus, it is
183. Toward this end, a court should take into account a child's progress after the
IEP has been formulated. As one judge explained:
When we are ... able to test the experts' predictions against the reality of the
occurrence, we accept the prediction and ignore the reality at the peril of reaching
an unjust result. I do not think the district court gives expert testimony in a state
administrative proceeding proper weight when it ignores evidence of what actually
happened to the child after the proceeding concluded. Of course, evidence of how
things turn out is not always dispositive on the issue of what is appropriate for
a particular child, but it seems to me that it is assuredly material. It sheds light
on the capabilities of the child and unveils the potential that once hid in the future.
Id. at 1045 (Hutchinson, J., concurring and dissenting) (footnote omitted).
184. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(C) (Supp. V 1993) (requiring the states to develop
procedures to assure that testing is not biased).
185. In other words, even if the tests are accurate, the significance of the test scores
will be seen differently depending on whether the interpreter adopts a passive-acceptant
model or active-modificational model. As previously noted, only to those relying on
the former is the test result a predictor of future functioning levels. See supra notes
52-55 and accompanying text.
186. Lovaas and Smith noted that:
Preliminary data indicate that a more powerful predictor than MA [mental age]
is how quickly the children learn during the first 3 months of treatment. Children
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essential that a trial program of intensive intervention be
attempted with all autistic children, and perhaps all developmen-
tally disabled children, as soon as possible following identification
of their disability. 187
The idea of a trial program is not new. Although normally
a child's IEP must be developed before placement, this require-
ment "does not preclude temporarily placing an eligible handi-
capped child in a program as part of the evaluation
process-before the IEP is finalized-to aid in determining the
most appropriate placement for the child." 88 Trial placements,
therefore, should be a standard part of the evaluation process.
If the child shows a good response to the intensive intervention,
then the finalized IEP would have to utilize that placement until
the child recovered or until the child's progress toward integra-
tion had halted. If a child fails to respond to the intensive
programming within a reasonable time, then an IEP calling for
some other program may be warranted.
In either event, the trial placement procedure allows the
relevant data concerning the child to be gathered prior to the
formulation of an IEP and utilized in the placement process.
This ensures that the child's future will not depend on the mere
possibility that the educational agency might initially recommend
intensive intervention or that parents will be able to utilize a
private placement to develop that same essential data.
The need to base programming decisions on reliable data rather
than speculation or prior custom is equally compelling. A strong
presumption should exist in favor of adoption of a program that
has been validated by meaningful scientific outcome studies.
On the other hand, programs that are not supported by scientific
studies which demonstrate that they will lead to integration
should be presumptively disfavored. This by itself should lead
who initially learned quickly almost always continued to do so, whereas children
who learned slowly at the beginning rarely caught up later in treatment.
Lovaas & Smith, supra note 9, at 312. Even this, however, is not wholly predictive.
Some children start slowly and then "spurt." Intensive programming must be given
enough of a chance to work so that a decision to terminate it will be made with confidence
that the particular child is not going to respond.
187. New tests are now being devised which may reliably permit diagnosis as young
as 18 months. See Simon Baron-Cohen et al., Can Autism Be Detected at 18 Months?
The Needle, the Haystack, and the CHAT, 161 BRiT. J. PsyCHIATRY 839 (1992)(the "CHAT"
is the "Checklist for Autism in Toddlers").
188. 34 C.F.R. app. § 300.350 (1993).
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to the adoption of programming which is demonstrably effective
in achieving the Act's integration goal.1
8 9
In cases in which empirical data do not exist, however,
decisions as to the selection of an appropriate methodology
invariably will be subject to dispute and eventually must be
determined through the formal dispute resolution process. In
this case, both the interim placement decision and the dispute
resolution process must be handled in a manner which is
consistent with the principles previously identified.190 This can
be accomplished by allocating the burden of proof in a manner
that will permit more children access to appropriate education.
Thus, a rebuttable presumption must be created in favor of: (1)
the child's capacity to be integrated, and (2) programs which
purport to lead to integration. Only where an agency can show
by clear and convincing evidence that a program not designed
to lead to integration is educationally appropriate for an
individual child could such a program be implemented.
2. Effective Implementation of Programs-The final area
of parent-educator conflict in achieving the secondary integration
goal of the Act is the implementation of the program selected. 191
It would be illogical to select a program that is designed to lead
to integration into the regular school, but conduct that program
in a manner that makes accomplishing that goal difficult or
impossible. For example, a school might elect to provide the
Lovaas program for preschool children for only ten hours per
week instead of forty hours per week. Inasmuch as research has
demonstrated that ten hours per week does not provide any
benefit,'92 a mechanism must be in place by which parents can
challenge the effectiveness of the manner in which the program
is being implemented.
189. Thus, programs which have not been demonstrated effective, such as "facilitated
communication," could be quickly rejected. Recent studies demonstrating the
ineffectiveness of facilitated communication are cited and summarized in 7 AUTISM
RES. REV. INT'L 7 (1993). TEACCH programming would also be rejected because it is
not intended to lead toward integration. Thus, TEACCH would fail the initial test.
See supra note 74.
190. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
191. See BUDOFF & ORENSTEIN, supra note 32, at 75-77 (quoting parents regarding
program implementation).
192. See supra table 1 and accompanying text (showing that, although children
in control group one received 10 hours per week of the same type of therapy as children
in the experimental group, none of the children in control group one recovered).
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The same concerns exist regarding the quality and competence
of the school district staff charged with the responsibility for
the program's day-to-day operation.'93 Although problems of
teacher competence are largely the educational agency's
responsibility, there is too much at stake in the case of special
education programming to leave such problems outside of the
scope of an "appropriateness" analysis. Special education has
little in common with regular education. If a normal child has
the occasional misfortune to be assigned an incompetent teacher
for a year, typically the harm caused can be corrected later
through a formal or informal remedial process. In the case of
preschool programming, on the other hand, there may well be
a small window of opportunity1 94 and the consequences of staff
incompetence, even for a single school year, are too great to leave
to the vagaries of the normal processes of collective bargaining,
hiring, firing, and tenure.
Perhaps even more important is the need to establish and
institutionalize regular and frequently-employed procedures to
assess the outcomes of particular programs and compare the
outcomes of one district to other districts.'95 This will result in
the collection of data which will permit decisions as to which
programs are best achieving the integration goals of the Act,
and why one district's program is better than another's. As things
presently stand, programming is utilized by schools with no way
of ascertaining if it is achieving positive results and no way of
comparing different programs or different manners of program
implementation. 196
193. See BUDOFF & ORENSTEIN, supra note 32, at 75 (quoting a mother, who had just
visited the program proposed for her child: "The teacher was a nice person, but she
is not geared to teach children with problems like my son.").
194. See supra note 180.
195. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
196. The local agency is required to furnish the following to the state agency:
such information (which, in the case of reports relating to performance, is in
accordance with specific performance criteria related to program objectives), as
may be necessary to enable the State educational agency to perform its duties
under this subchapter, including information relating to the educational
achievement of children with disabilities participating in programs carried out
under this subchapter ....
20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1993). Nevertheless, it appears that no systematic
effort is made to compare the result obtained by one program to those obtained by others.
See supra note 154.
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E. The Need for Interim Funding and True
Impartiality in Dispute Resolution
It is critical not orily to maximize accuracy in providing a child
with a substantively appropriate program, but also to do so
quickly so that valuable opportunities to achieve progress are
not lost. Furthermore, when disputes arise, they must be resolved
fairly. The Act's drafters contemplated that both goals would
be met in the resolution of parent-educator disputes. '97 The
former goal was to be accomplished by the formal requirement
of hearing officer impartiality.'9 8 The latter objective was to be
accomplished by requiring compliance with specific time
deadlines.'9 9 Unfortunately, neither the time deadlines nor
197. Of course, there was also an assumption that the educational agency would
comply not only with the procedures established under the Act but also with any
administrative agency's order or decision issued pursuant to the established procedures.
Unfortunately, that is not always the case.
Even favorable results frequently have been of little comfort to parents. Some
education agencies complied with the hearing officer's directives immediately;
others waited until a few adverse decisions accumulated. On the other hand, there
were many opportunities for procedural gamesmanship and non-compliance. Even
if schools lost at the hearing level, they might appeal to the state level for relief
from the hearing officer's decision. If the appeal process was not too discouraging,
schools could still frustrate the parents by ... simply refusing to comply. In many
instances, nothing compelled schools to provide the program the hearing system
required. If these devices were too crude, districts also learned that they could
temporarily comply, but then reevaluate the child at the legally mandated point
... and resubmit that original plan on the basis of their reevaluation.
Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 21, at 36 (citations omitted).
198. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1988) ("No hearing conducted pursuant to the require-
ments of this paragraph shall be conducted by an employee of such agency or unit
involved in the education or care of the child."); see Muth v. Smith, 646 F. Supp. 280,
285 (E.D. Pa. 1986) ("Congress was concerned that handicapped minors and their parents
be assured impartial review. To this end, they want to ensure that the individuals
conducting the reviews be as free from political and fiscal pressures as possible."), aff'd
sub nom. Muth v. Central Bucks Sch. Dist., 839 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 491 U.S. 223 (1989). Hearing officer bias remains a significant factor affecting
the outcome of the hearings. See Peter J. Kuriloff, Is Justice Served by Due Process ?:
Affecting the Outcome of Special Education Hearings in Pennsylvania, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1985, at 89, 106.
199. For example, in Pennsylvania, the multidisciplinary evaluation must be done
within 45 days of receiving parental permission, 22 PA. CODE § 14.53(i)(1) (1992); the
evaluation report must be completed within 10 days after completion of the evaluation
report, id. § 14.53(i)(3); an IEP must be developed within 30 days of the issuance of
the evaluation report, id. § 14.54(j)(1); if the IEP is rejected by the parents and a "due
process" hearing is requested, it must be held within 30 days, 22 PA. CODE § 14.64(o)(1)
(1933); the hearing officer must issue a decision within 45 days after the hearing was
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impartiality requirements are accomplishing their goals
sufficiently under many circumstances.20 0
1. The Need for Interim Funding-When a parent-educator
dispute arises because the educational agency wishes to remove
the child from the regular, public education program and place
the child into special education, federal law precludes the
removal of the child pending the resolution of the dispute.2"'
The so-called "stay put" rule, however, may serve to preserve
the status quo even under circumstances where the status quo
is harmful to the child. In cases in which the dispute centers
around the appropriateness of the initial preschool placement,
application of the "stay put" rule fixes the obligation to pay for
a program during pendency of the litigation.2 2 Thus, if parents
accept a proposed placement and soon thereafter realize that
it is not beneficial to the child, the school district will not be
required to pay for a change in placement while the dispute is
being resolved. This may result in the continuation of an
inappropriate placement for long periods of time while an
irreplaceable opportunity to help the child is squandered.20 3
Similarly, if parents are capable of unilaterally placing their
child in a private program, they must do so at their own
expense.20 4 The fact that the parents must bear the cost of
requested, id. § 14-64(o) (2); exceptions to the decision of the hearing officer and briefs
on exceptions must then be filed within 30 days and the opposing side has 20 days
after the 30 day period to respond, 1 PA. CODE § 35.211 (1993). If, thereafter, the decision
of the appeals panel is appealed to federal district court under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)
(1988), the statute of limitations will be governed by state law with the federal courts
determining which limitations period is analogous and appropriate, because the Act
does not specify a time limit. See Tokarcik v. Forest Hills Sch. Dist., 665 F.2d 443,
447-55 (3d Cir. 1981) (discussing the application of various Pennsylvania statutes of
limitations to an appeal in federal court pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)).
200. See Kuriloff, supra note 198, at 106 (finding that "[plarents did worse [at the
due process hearing] if the primary work affiliation of the hearing officer was with
the local schools"); supra note 197.
201. The federal statute provides:
During the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section,
unless the State or local educational agency and the parents or guardian otherwise
agree, the child shall remain in the then current educational placement of such
child, or, if applying for initial admission to a public school, shall, with the consent
of the parents or guardian, be placed in the public school program until all such
proceedings have been completed.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1988).
202. Stacey G. v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 695 F.2d 949, 953 (5th Cir. 1983).
203. See supra note 180.
204. This, of course, is one of the reasons that the Act is utilized disproportionately
by middle- and upper-class parents. Parents who cannot afford private placements
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programming may well put the litigation costs of challenging
the educational agency's proposal beyond reach. °"
The question then arises as to what event short of a
non-appealable judicial declaration will trigger the educational
agency's obligation to fund a private program during the
pendency of the litigation. One answer is that, in an appropriate
case, a court may issue a mandatory preliminary injunction
requiring public funding during the pendency of the action.0 6
There are, however, two problems with this solution. First, one
of the requirements for the issuance of an injunction is that the
party seeking the injunction must show probable ultimate success
on the merits. 2 7 Early in the litigation process, this is difficult,
are frequently reluctant to antagonize local school district personnel by pursuing their
rights under the Act.
Middle and upper class parents do not face such high odds, for they have an exit
strategy. Their complaints typically assert the inability of the local school district
to provide "appropriate" education and claim reimbursement for tuition in private
schools. If this proves unsuccessful, these parents can pay for the private schooling
themselves.
Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 21, at 78 (citations omitted); see also Engel, supra note
171, at 169 ("The goals of the EHA may have been thwarted, at least in part, because
parents are unwilling to jeopardize relationships by asserting their children's rights.");
Handler, supra note 22, at 1010-12 (discussing the Madison, Wisconsin plan which
provides the parents with an advocate to represent them during the IEP development
phase).
205. See BUDOFF & ORENSTEIN, supra note 32, at 146. One parent interviewed by the
authors explained:
We looked at the other families and saw that schools are now winning. They write
much better plans, though we felt they still didn't have the people in the schools
who could carry through. But to win, we would need a sharp lawyer. So we decided
not to risk it. It's like everything else: if you're rich, you can fight them. But if
we lost, we'd be out the tuition plus the lawyer. So we couldn't do it. So now we're
paying the [private school] tuition. I don't know what to do about it. We're really
hurting financially.
Id.
206. See Stacey G., 695 F.2d at 955 (finding that neither federal nor state regulations
required a preliminary injunction, but remanding to the district court to consider
injunctive relief based on "its traditional equitable powers to consider irreparable harm
and the likelihood of success in obtaining some relief on the merits").
207. See, e.g., id.; Cox v. Brown, 498 F. Supp. 823, 828 (D.D.C. 1980). According
to the Cox court:
For the Court to grant the extraordinary injunctive relief requested, the plaintiffs
must clearly demonstrate (1) that there is a substantial likelihood that they will
succeed on the merits of the case, (2) that irreparable harm would occur to the
plaintiffs absent such an injunction, (3) that an injunction would not substantially
harm the rights of the third party, and (4) that an injunction is in the public
interest.
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particularly in view of the fact that the Act permits additional
evidence to be introduced at the federal district court level.2 °8
Second, if attempted prior to the time when the case reaches
the state or federal court, it is not clear that an administrative
law hearing officer has the power to issue such a mandatory
injunction. In addition, it can take at least six months to exhaust
administrative procedures even if there has been total compliance
with all time limits.
20 9
It is possible, though not entirely certain, that the matter can
be resolved under the existing legislation. The stay put rule is
applicable "unless the State or local educational agency and the
parents or guardian otherwise agree., 210 The question which
then arises is whether a decision favorable to the parents by
an administrative hearing officer or state reviewing panel
constitutes an "agreement" within the meaning of section
1415(e)(3) which would require public funding of a private
program pending final resolution. Although language in Town
of Burlington v. Department of Education211 would seem to
indicate that this is the requirement under the Act, the lack
of reported decisions leads one to believe it is utilized rarely.212
2. The Need for Impartiality in Dispute Resolution-Not only
are many parents unlikely to utilize the Act at all,213 but even
if they do, it is not clear that parents will prevail at the local
or state level as often as they should. 21 '4 The problem in this
regard is that local and state administrative hearing officers
and review panels often lack impartiality. While the Act provides
for an "impartial" third party to carry out the dispute resolution
function,1 5 this may be inadequate. For example, while the
hearing officer cannot be an employee of the school district,
208. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1988).
209. See supra note 199. This gives the agency an incentive in some cases to
deliberately delay and utilize the financial strain on the parents of the disabled child
as leverage in any settlement discussions. See supra note 197.
210. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3)(1988).
211. 736 F.2d 773,800 (1st Cir. 1984) ("Implementation of a state agency's determi-
nation of the appropriate education for a disabled child should not be delayed until
... a final judicial decision has been rendered where an appeal has been taken.").
212. But see Delaware County Intermediate Unit No. 25 v. Martin K, 831 F. Supp.
1206, 1221-23 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that parents are entitled to rely on a state ruling
that private placement must be funded).
213. See supra note 204.
214. Regarding the percentage of cases that parents "win," see Kuriloff, supra note
198, at 99 n.48 (noting studies that indicate parents are fully successful in only 4%
of all cases, although some of their substantive demands are met in 31 to 42% of the
cases).
215. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
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nothing in the Act prohibits retired school officials or others who
have already chosen sides in the parent-educator wars from
serving in a dispute resolution capacity. 216 Furthermore, when
the case involves the assessment of alternative methodologies,
there is nothing to prevent adherents of one tradition or another
from controlling the decision-making process.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE CHANGE
It is apparent that many of the problems discussed in the
preceding pages can be remedied without the need to formally
amend the Act. For example, substantive appropriateness of
programming for disabled children can and should be understood
under the existing Act as encompassing only those programs
which are designed to result in integration into the regular public
school at the earliest possible time.217 Similarly, the need for
ongoing assessment of existing programming21 and the need
for true impartiality of those conducting or reviewing special-
education due process hearings219 can arguably be addressed
within the existing framework. 20 Nevertheless, a clarification
of the Act by formal amendment would serve to enhance the
goal of uniformity of interpretation and application.22'
216. The problem here, of course, is not unique to hearing officers. For example,
in Doyle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100, 102-03 (4th Cir. 1991), the plaintiffs
argued that the trial judge should have recused himself since he had served on the
county school board prior to his appointment to the bench. The court held, however,
that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988) did not require the judge to do so. Id.
In my own case, the hearing officer was a retired special education director for a
different school district. She identified with the Intermediate Unit's personnel and
position so completely that, at one point in the hearing, she referred to the IU's proposal
to institute a variation of TEACCH as "the program that we're... proposing." Transcript
of Special Educ. Due Process Hearing at 140-41, In re Paul Kotler, (Mar. 10, 1992)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
217. See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 149, 151, 154, 160, 196.
221. As one author explained:
Uniform standards are essential, given the particular sensitivity of issues involving
handicapped persons and the fact that so many different groups are provided
protections by one omnibus statute. Determining these standards may result in
a difficult, devisive process, but as Calabresi and Bobbitt have stated, "[w]e are
one nation, and it is offensive to have fundamental allocations depend on the
chance of where in the land one lives.-
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Therefore, I propose that the Act be amended in the following
manner.
222
A. Clarify the Meaning of "Free Appropriate
Public Education"
The definition of a "free appropriate public education" in section
1401(18) is as follows:
special education and related services that-
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public
supervision and direction, and without charge,
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency,
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or
secondary school education in the State involved, and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized
education program required under section 1414(a)(5) of this
title.223
In order to clarify the meaning, the foregoing should be
amended by the addition of a subsection (E) which would read:
(E) whenever possible, are designed to permit the child to
make sufficient progress to be integrated, as soon as
reasonably possible, into the regular public education system
without the need for significant further special education
and/or related services.
This is, of course, the key to understanding the goal of special
education. While there will be unavoidable failures to achieve
Stark, supra note 37, at 529 (alteration in original) (quoting GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP
BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 53 (1978)).
222. Portions which are italicized are proposed additions to the Act. Words in brackets
are proposed deletions.
223. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1988).
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this end in individual cases, its formal recognition as the goal
of the Act will positively influence special education.224
B. Reorder Priorities in Providing Services
Currently, federal legislation sets priorities for the provision
of service by conditioning the state's eligibility for federal funds
on the state's adoption of a plan containing specified features,
including the establishment of priorities. Presently, the first
priority group is children who are not receiving any services.
Second are the most severely disabled within each disability
group. The proposed amendment would insert a new priority
class between the first two as follows:
225
§ 1412 Eligibility requirements
In order to qualify for assistance under this subchapter in
any fiscal year, a State shall demonstrate to the Secretary
that the following conditions are met:
(3) The State has established priorities for providing
a free appropriate public education to all children with
disabilities, which priorities shall meet the timetables
set forth in clause (B) of paragraph (2) of this section,
first with respect to children with disabilities who are
not receiving an education, and second with respect to
children whose potential to be integrated into the regular
school system may be jeopardized by the failure to
immediately provide appropriate services, and third with
respect to children with disabilities, within each disability
category, with the most severe disabilities who are
receiving an inadequate education .... 226
224. See supra text accompanying notes 101-10 (discussing the need to define
"appropriateness" in terms of programming which is designed to permit the child to
recover and then be integrated into the regular public school system).
225. 20 U.S.C.§ 1414 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) describes the requisite features in the
LEA's or IU's application for funding to the state educational agency. Section
1414(a)(1)(C)(ii), which contains the same list of priorities as section 1412(3), should
be amended by adoption of language to keep the priorities in both sections the same.
226. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(3) (Supp. V 1993).
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While the remediation of the pre-Act primary exclusion problem
should remain the top priority,22 the prioritization by severity
within categories of disability would not necessarily seem to
further either the goals of cost efficiency or the child's dignity.
As previously noted, these goals will be furthered by the provision
of services to those who can benefit22 and this classification cuts
across traditional notions of severity, that is, some severely
disabled children can receive enormous benefit from services
while others cannot. The proposed amendment is added for the
purpose of expressly acknowledging that, for some children, there
may only be a brief window of opportunity to recover from what
may otherwise be a lifetime of disability.229 In those cases, it
is essential that the children be identified and appropriate
services be provided before the opportunity is lost.
C. Limit the Use of Standardized Tests
The existing legislation recognizes the ongoing problem of
inaccurate test scores resulting from racially or culturally
discriminatory tests.' The legislation further recognizes the
danger of educational misplacement if decisions are based on
a single test. The legislation, however, does not address the
problem of using test scores to predict future performance.231
Thus, the existing eligibility requirements of section 1412 should
be amended as follows:
227. One of the Act's notable successes has been to alleviate substantially this
problem. According to Clune & Van Pelt, "the most obvious and shocking problem with
which the legislation was concerned-the complete exclusion of handicapped children
from schools-was the most completely solved." Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 21, at
52. See also supra text accompanying notes 38-47 (noting that the intent of the Act
was to bring disabled children who were not receiving services into the system).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 171-72.
229. See supra note 180.
230. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text; see also supra note 186 (discussing
children's ability to learn in intensive programming as a better predictor of recovery
than mental age).
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§ 1412 Eligibility requirements
In order to qualify for assistance under this subchapter in
any fiscal year, a State shall demonstrate to the Secretary
that the following conditions are met:
(5) The State has established... (C) procedures to
assure that testing and evaluation materials and
procedures utilized for the purposes of evaluation and
placement of children with disabilities will be selected
and administered so as not to be racially or culturally
discriminatory. Such materials or procedures shall be
provided and administered in the child's native language
or mode of communication, unless it clearly is not
feasible to do so, and no single procedure shall be the
sole criterion for determining an appropriate educational
program for a child[.] or used to predict future progress
or assess a child's capacity to make progress.232
Properly designed and administered standardized tests may
well provide valuable information as to a child's current level
of functioning and valuable insight into present areas of strengths
and weaknesses. While this information will be helpful in
designing a child's program if an active-modificational approach
is adopted, it is highly destructive under the passive-acceptant
approach.233 The proposed addition seeks, in effect, to require
a presumption of future progress by abolishing a common misuse
and misinterpretation of test scores.
D. Strengthen Procedural Safeguards
The procedural safeguards set forth in section 1415 of the Act
include the following requirement:
Any State educational agency, any local educational agency,
and any intermediate educational unit which receives
assistance under this subchapter shall establish and maintain
procedures in accordance with subsection (b) through
232. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (Supp. V 1993).
233. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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subsection (e) of this section to assure that children with
disabilities and their parents or guardians are guaranteed
procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of free
appropriate public education by such agencies and units.234
As previously indicated, however, the procedures established
have not equalized adequately the power between parents and
educators. Therefore, certain changes are needed.
1. Require Full Disclosure to Parents-Presently, section
1415(b)(1)(C) requires the educational entity to provide parents
with written notices regarding placements and changes of
placement. As previously discussed, in too many cases the
achievement of the Act's goals is compromised by a lack of full
disclosure of programming options, long range goals for the
individual child, and the potential to accomplish those goals in
the programs being conducted by the educational entity.235 To
help alleviate this problem, the written disclosure requirement
should be amended as follows:
§ 1415 Procedural Safeguards
The procedures required by this section shall include, but
shall not be limited to-
(C) written prior notice to the parents or guardian of
the child whenever such agency or unit-
(i) proposes to initiate or change, or
(ii) refuses to initiate or change,
the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of
the child or the provision of a free appropriate public
education to the child[;]. Such written notice shall fully
disclose to the parent or guardian in terms and language
understandable to the layman the reason for the agency's
proposal, the anticipated potential to later integrate the child
into the regular public schools if the proposal is implemented
and any other possible placement for the child and the agency's
rationale for recommending one rather than another. Whenever
possible, all such recommendations and rationales shall be
234. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
235. See supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
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based on empirical data generated by outcome studies of
programs done in accordance with professionally accepted
methodologies.
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Although requiring full disclosure of programming options
to parents is essential if the goals ofthe Act are to be achieved,237
this disclosure need not necessarily occur at the written notice
stage. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the child should be assessed
and programming options be considered before the educational
agency proposes a program, or refuses to initiate or change a
program, information regarding alternative programming will
have been gathered by the educational agency prior to the
placement decision. Thus, the written notice regarding the
placement decision can be expanded conveniently to permit the
agency to convey programming options to the parents.
2. Ensure Impartial Hearing Officers-As the statute is
written, only an employee of the agency that is involved in the
dispute with the parents is precluded from serving as a hearing
officer. This, however, does not go far enough toward ensuring
impartiality. There is nothing in the statute which would preclude
a former employee of the agency from serving. More importantly,
there is nothing that would prevent an individual from serving
who has spent his or her entire career furthering the interests
of another educational agency against claims of parents.
To remedy the problems of bias created by employing hearing
officers 238 who either currently work for an educational agency
or have worked for one in the past,239 section 1415(b) should
be amended, in relevant part, as follows:
(2)... No hearing conducted pursuant to the requirements
of this paragraph shall be conducted by any person who is
or has ever been an employee of any educational [such] agency
or unit. [involved in the education or care of the child.]
240
236. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(C)(i) & (ii) (1988).
237. See supra text accompanying note 171.
238. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(B) (1988) provides for the assignment of an individual
to act on behalf of the disabled child "whenever the parents or guardian of the child
are not known, unavailable, or the child is a ward of the State ... ." To ensure that
the person so assigned can best represent the child's interest, this section should probably
be amended in a manner similar to that proposed for § 1415(b)(2).
239. See supra note 216.
240. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1988).
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While the proposed change clearly would disqualify many
experienced, qualified, and capable individuals from serving as
hearing officers, the need to eliminate both those who are actually
biased and those who appear to be biased by reason of their past
experiences, however, is essential to the integrity of the process.
3. Abolish the Educational Agency's Right to Appeal-As
the Act is currently structured, under section 1415(c) either
the parent or the educational agency has the right to appeal
an adverse decision of the hearing officer or to further appeal
an adverse decision of the reviewing agency. The proposed
amendment alters this so that only a parent or some other
person acting on the child's behalf has the power to appeal.
Thus, the following changes to section 1415 are proposed:
(c) Review of local decision by State educational
agency
If the hearing required in paragraph (2) of subsection (b)
of this section is conducted by a local educational agency
or an intermediate educational unit, any party acting on
behalf of the disabled child aggrieved by the findings and
decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal to the
State educational agency which shall conduct an impartial
review of such hearing. The officer conducting such review
shall make an independent decision upon completion of
such review.2 4 '
(e) Civil action; jurisdiction
(1) A decision made in a hearing conducted pursuant to
paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this section shall be
final, except that any [party involved in such hearing]
person acting on behalf of the disabled child may appeal
such decision under the provisions of subsection (c) and
paragraph (2) of this subsection. A decision made under
subsection (c) of this section shall be final, except that
[any party] any person acting on behalf of the disabled
child may bring an action under paragraph (2) of this
subsection.
(2) Any [party] person acting on behalf of the disabled
child aggrieved by the findings and decision made under
subsection (b) of this section who does not have the right
241. See id. § 1415(c).
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to an appeal under subsection (c) of this section, and any
[party] person acting on behalf of the disabled child
aggrieved by the findings and decision under subsection
(c) of this section, shall have the right to bring a civil
action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant
to this section, which action may be brought in any State
court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the
United States.... 242
Once the hearing officer or reviewing officer and parent or
guardian of a child agree on an appropriate resolution of the
matter, the process should come to an end. In most cases, the
LEA's or IU's only legitimate interest in appealing an adverse
decision is financial. Since the funding for any program
implemented pursuant to this process will ultimately come
from the state,243 the local agencies' legitimate interests are
not substantially impaired by an adverse decision.
On the other hand, the illegitimate use of the appeals
process-appeal for the purpose of delaying, seeking leverage
in negotiation with the parents, or in order to develop a
reputation that will discourage parents from asserting their
rights under the Act-is all too common.244 Thus, the proposed
amendments seek to make it clear that only one seeking to
protect the interest of the child has the right to appeal a
decision with which they disagree.
If the foregoing change to sections 1415(c), 1415(e)(1) & (2)
are made, then the "stay put" rule of section 1415(3) need not
be changed. As discussed earlier, the major drawback of the
"stay put" rule is that parents are forced to bear the financial
responsibility for a private placement while the educational
agency endlessly appeals. 245 This problem largely is resolved
by eliminating the educational agencies' standing to appeal.
If the parents appeal the matter to the courts and it is
alleged that the child is in immediate need of privately
provided programming during the pendency of the litigation
which the parents are financially unable to provide, the court's
traditional equity power would enable it to issue a mandatory
injunction. 246 This would require the state or local educational
agency to fund a private program pending final determination
242. See id. § 1415(e)(1) & (2).
243. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 205, 209.
245. See supra text accompanying note 202.
246. See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
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in court. The possibility of losing an opportunity to integrate
a child into the public schools should clearly constitute
"irreparable injury" justifying the exercise of such equitable
powers.2 4 7
CONCLUSION
In the tradition of liberal legalism, the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act sought both to create a right to a
substantively appropriate education and to protect that right
by empowering parents to act on their children's behalf. The
widely perceived failure of the Act to accomplish the drafters'
intent can be traced to the lack of a definition of "substantive
appropriateness" in the Act itself, and to the failure of the
courts to provide a meaningful definition thereafter. Another
cause of this failure was the significant shortcomings in the
Act's attempts to enable parents to deal effectively with school
district personnel.
In this Article, I have attempted to deal with both the
substantive and procedural shortcomings. I deal with the
substantive shortcoming by replacing vague notions of student
"benefit" or "meaningful progress" with a definition which I
believe is fully supported by the essential justifications for the
Act's existence. An educational program is "appropriate" if it
is one designed to lead toward full integration or reintegration
into the regular public education system, preferably without
the need for continuing special education services. If such a
program exists, both long-term social cost considerations and
society's obligation to promote the dignity of the individual
disabled child demand that it be implemented.
While I believe that this definition is already mandated by
the Act's identification of both integration and appropriate
educational programming as its goals, I have proposed an
amendment to the statutory definition of a "free, appropriate
public education" in order to make matters more explicit.
Agreement on a definition of "appropriateness" will eliminate
many problems which currently exist between parents and
educators. Nevertheless, parent-educator conflict will ine-
vitably continue to exist. Although the procedural provisions
247. In this context, of course, it would normally be difficult for a parent to
convince the court of probable ultimate success on the merits. See supra notes 207-09
and accompanying text.
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of the Act may have partially remediated the pre-Act disparity
of power between parents and educators, all too often
educators can continue to frustrate the drafters' vision of
special education as a truly cooperative venture between
parent and educator.
I have made a number of proposals which I believe will
prove helpful in this context. To the extent that parent-
educator conflict is engendered by educators usurping parental
decision making by failing to inform parents about available
programming, the full disclosure amendment should lessen
this conflict.
More importantly, I believe that the proposed full disclosure
requirement will force a frank examination of the disparity of
outcomes between programming available privately and that
available publicly. It is my hope that this will require
educators, politicians and taxpayers to confront the elitism
which exists in the current system. Through the current
practice of pretending that public and private programs are
comparable, or at least tacitly representing to parents that the
programs are equal, the unfairness is effectively masked and
the impetus for improvement blunted.
Having concluded that neither parents nor educators can be
entrusted with the sole decision-making responsibility under
the Act, it became necessary to look for some general principle
which could be utilized to resolve disputes when they arose. The
principle of maximizing accuracy in the assessment of the child
and selection of an appropriate program for him is mandated
both by the cost-effectiveness and the promotion of the child's
dignity justifications for the Act. Application of this principle
would require, at a minimum, information-generating procedures
such as trial placements. It would abolish the use of a "prospec-
tive test" for assessing the appropriateness of proposed place-
ments. Appropriateness would have to be assessed by looking
at all available information including a child's actual performance
in a particular program. Furthermore, the principle would require
that hard data be generated on the effectiveness of programming
so that the decision-making process can result in a maximum
number of children being placed in programs designed to lead
to integration.
Finally, some of the proposed amendments seek to correct the
devastating problems of delay by expressly prioritizing the
provision of services to those with the potential for integration,
and by limiting the educational agency's ability to delay the
process.
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The available research seems to indicate that, on the whole,
better results are obtained when intensive intervention is
provided earlier rather than later. In cases in which the parents
can afford to privately provide programming while the process
endlessly unwinds, the child is unharmed. For each child so
fortunate, however, there are many others who are simply lost
because of the parent's inability to pay for programming when
it will do the most good. Once that opportunity is lost, there
is no legal remedy worthy of discussion. We as a society cannot
afford and should not tolerate this type of inequality.

